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This study investigates the relationship between an audit signee’s overall audit experience and audit 
fees. In contrast with most prior literature, the study uses a measure of the overall experience of 
auditors to examine this relationship as opposed to measures such as audit tenure or industry 
specialization. The study is motivated mainly by the dearth of literature on the effects of auditors’ 
personal characteristics on audit work and fees and the opportunity provided by the Finnish 
regulatory context to examine these issues. 
The study uses data from the financial statements of the 500 largest Finnish companies from the 
fiscal years 2012-2016 to test whether audit fees are positively associated with experience. To this 
end, three audit fee regression models are constructed with varying definitions of the experience 
variable. The models are applied to two samples: a sample consisting of all the firm-year 
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Big Four audit firms. 
The results of the study indicate that audit fees are not, overall, positively associated with audit 
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Further research is encouraged to establish a better understanding of this relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the effect of an individual auditor’s overall work experience on audit 
fees in large Finnish companies. A theoretical background is provided through a literature 
review of research concerning the demand for auditing services, the audit process and its 
objectives. This is then connected to the existing literature on audit experience and audit fees 
to establish an understanding of how an auditor’s experience may come to affect audit fees. 
This introductory chapter outlines the background and motivation of this study, the research 
questions and hypotheses, study design and data as well as the structure of the work. 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
In recent years the quality of external audits has been under great scrutiny. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, regulators have often come up with new laws and regulations 
aimed at improving the independence of auditors and the quality of audits in order to promote 
confidence in the financial markets (EC 2017; GAO 2003; ICAEW 2005). The impetus for 
these developments came largely from major corporate accounting scandals in the beginning 
of the century, with the financial crisis of 2008 prompting further regulatory action (e.g. EU 
Regulation 537/2014; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). As a result, the external auditor has 
to address an ever-larger amount of issues related to independence, audit documentation and 
the scope of audit procedures in order to be compliant with the various norms regulating 
audit work. Consequently, the workload of audit engagements has grown significantly, 
potentially increasing the costs of conducting an audit and incurring upwards pressure on 
audit fees charged from clients (Ghosh & Pawlewicz 2009; Raghunandan & Rama 2006). 
An external audit is a multi-stage process, during which many costs are incurred. In light of 
the recent developments in audit regulation and their consequent impacts on the workload 
of audit engagements, it is therefore of interest to various parties to understand precisely how 
audit fees are determined. While research on audit fees is plenty (Causholli et al. 2010; Hay 
2013; Hay et al. 2006), much of it has focused on client-specific factors and audit firm -
specific factors, with less consideration given to the personal characteristics of the auditor 
(Cahan & Sun 2015; Gul et al. 2013). In addition, a large part of the literature dates back to 
times during which the audit industry was, overall, subject to far less regulatory pressures 
and demands. Yet, as Gul et al. (2013) argue, it seems likely that, given the nature of audit 
work, the personal characteristics of auditors are also relevant for assessing the quality of 
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the audit. Their evidence obtained from the Chinese audit market lends support for such an 
assumption. If this is the case, then perhaps audit fees will also vary with experience, 
mediated by actual or perceived audit quality. Hay et al. (2006) also make the argument that 
higher fees may follow higher auditor quality, although they refer here to audit firm rather 
than individual characteristics. If this is so, then it is not far-fetched to suggest that the same 
might be the case for individual auditors. 
While the determinants of fees have received much attention in the literature overall, this is 
less true of the Finnish audit market. Although the norms governing the auditing profession 
are largely international, national legislation, the institutional environment and supervision 
by governmental agencies also play a crucial part in how auditing practice takes shape in its 
local contexts. It is therefore important also to consider these issues on a national level. Audit 
fees are subject to regional peculiarities in the regulatory environments, especially as they 
relate to potential liabilities arising for audit firms from an audit failure (Choi et al. 2008). 
The various differing characteristics of local audit markets are also not to be ignored. For 
instance, to what degree is the high-end audit market concentrated? What are the market 
shares of each Big Four firm (Deloitte, EY, KPMG & PWC) in a given country, and how do 
their practices differ amongst each other and with respect to smaller competitors? Is there a 
Big Four premium in audit fees? Are there other competitors who are sufficiently large and 
reputable to be able to add competitive pressure to the audit market? Such issues are also 
likely to affect how fees are formed in a given market.  
As outlined above, there appears to be a need for obtaining information about the 
determinants of audit fees on a local level, as generalized theories and evidence gathered in 
one context may not be fully applicable to another. To the author’s knowledge, only one 
study to date (Niemi 2004) has directly examined the relationship of an auditor’s overall 
experience with audit fees in the Finnish audit market. This study attempts to address this 
need by providing evidence from the 500 largest Finnish companies (TE500 Companies). 
The 500 largest companies, in this case, are defined on the basis of revenue. As in most 
western countries, the Finnish audit market of large companies is largely dominated by the 
so-called Big Four audit firms (Abidin et al. 2010; EC 2017, p. 7; GAO 2008, p. 15; PRH 
2016). Yet, as the Finnish Patent and Registration Office’s (2016) market study shows, other 
firms are also able to compete with the Big Four to some degree, likely at least with regard 
to the smaller TE500 companies. The scope of this study is therefore not limited to an 
examination of audit fees within the Big Four. 
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The fact that the auditor’s personal characteristics have received less attention is largely due 
to the scarcity of publicly available information about the characteristics of individual 
auditors (Cahan & Sun 2015).  As discussed above, the body of research on audit fees in 
general, however, is very broad. Causholli et al. (2010) and Hay et al. (2006) have noted that 
more than 180 independent variables had been included in audit fee research in more than 
100 published papers. In recent years, further research has doubtless added to these figures. 
In his meta-analysis, Hay (2013) pointed out that regression models of audit fees tend to 
explain roughly 70% or more of the variation in audit fees, while also pointing out that these 
models nonetheless fail to capture some elements of the pricing process of audits. Causholli 
et al. (2010) further argued that the pricing process of audits includes various interdependent 
factors affecting its outcome. Thus, there a better understanding of audit pricing and the 
complex linkages found therein is in order. 
DeFond & Francis (2005) noted that some in some countries it is possible to analyze auditors 
on the level of the individual, as opposed to the previous research that has focused largely 
on the firm-level, or to a lesser extent, the office-level. The Finnish regulatory context 
provides a fertile ground for providing further insight into these issues. The Finnish Patent 
and Registration Office (PRH) maintains a register of all authorized public accountants 
(Finnish: KHT). Each year, PRH publishes the results of the auditor authorization exams. 
The results indicate the names of those who have passed the exam, if permitted by the 
examinee, as is usually the case. Additionally, auditing norms applicable in Finland require 
disclosing the audit signee’s name in the audit report (Auditing Act 1141/2015, chapter 3, 
section 5, subsection 1). This makes it possible to measure an audit report signee’s overall 
audit experience. This opportunity is used to study if audit fees are related to the auditor’s 
overall experience in the Finnish market in order to provide more detailed information on 
the formation of audit fees. 
This question is all the more interesting because, in principle, audit experience could be 
associated with audit fees through many different pathways, and with effects in either 
direction. For instance, one might intuitively expect experienced auditors to be able to charge 
a higher price for their services based on accumulated reputation. One could speculate that 
it is easier for auditor to establish a strong reputation in a smaller market, such as in Finland. 
Some studies have suggested that experienced auditors may possess more expertise or 
perform better in certain auditing tasks (e.g Davis 1996; Libby & Frederick 1990; Yen 2012). 
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If this is the case, then perhaps the quality of their work is better and they are able to extract 
a premium.  
Alternatively, it is also conceivable that experienced auditors do not produce higher quality 
audit work. For instance, Knechel et al. (2013) noted that implicit career incentives are 
weakened by short career horizons. In other words, more experience auditors, who are closer 
to retirement, may have weaker incentives to produce high quality audits. Additionally, more 
experienced auditors tend to have larger client portfolios, which Sundgren and Svanström 
(2014) suggested may negatively influence audit quality, as the auditor is able to expend less 
time on each assignment. Their evidence also points to a negative association between 
auditor age and going-concern reporting, potentially lending some credence to the claims of 
Knechel et al. (2013). Others have found that more experienced auditors may be less 
skeptical than inexperienced ones (Shaub & Lawrence 2002, cited in Nelson 2009). From a 
theoretical standpoint, then, the effects of an auditor’s overall experience on audit quality 
and fees do not appear clear-cut.  
This study is motivated by the dearth of information on the effects of the personal 
characteristics of auditors and how they relate to audit quality and fees. The seemingly 
ambiguous impacts of experience on audit work are worthy of consideration in their own 
right. The opportunity provided by the Finnish regulatory and supervisory context to 
investigate these issues also motivates this study. The study seeks to address these questions, 
first and foremost, in the context of the Finnish audit markets. However, such an examination 
may still provide valuable insights potentially applicable on a broader level as well. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study seeks to answer the question of whether the overall audit experience of an 
individual audit signee is associated with higher fees in the audit market of large Finnish 
(TE500) companies. Given the complexity of the ways in which experience could influence 
fees, this is, admittedly, an ambitious goal. However, an attempt will be made to provide a 
firm theoretical understanding of these issues followed by an empirical investigation to 
substantiate or refute potential claims drawn from theory. The research question of this study 
is formulated thusly: 
RQ1: Is the overall audit experience of authorized public accountants associated 
with higher audit fees in the audit market of large Finnish companies? 
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Cahan and Sun (2015) observed a positive association between overall experience and fees 
in the Chinese audit market. A similar result was also noted in a Finnish context by Niemi 
(2004), though the focus of his study was somewhat different. On the other hand, a negative 
association was observed by Hardies et al. (2015) in Belgian firms. As discussed above in 
chapter 1.1, some previous studies on auditor expertise and task-specific performance 
suggest that experience may be positively associated with the quality of audit work. Yet, 
other views have also been presented. Studies that have found auditor tenure and industry 
specialization to be associated with quality may also imply that some sort of valuable 
learning takes place in auditors’ work. Given the relatively small Finnish audit market, a 
reputation for quality may be relatively easy for individual auditors to establish. This could 
facilitate a positive association. Based on these considerations, the hypothesis of Cahan and 
Sun (2015, p. 84) is therefore replicated, verbatim, with regard to the audit market of Finnish 
TE500 companies: 
H1: Audit fees are positively associated with signee’s audit experience. 
1.3 SAMPLE AND METHODS 
The study investigates the relationship between audit experience and audit fees to answer H1 
through ordinary least squares regression (OLS) estimation. The samples selected consist of 
data gathered on the financials of the 500 Finnish companies with the largest revenues 
(“TE500 Companies”) during 2012-2016. The companies included in the samples are based 
on the list of the 500 largest companies published yearly by the Finnish finance and business 
magazine Talouselämä. The sample includes data for both listed and non-listed limited 
liability companies as well as some co-operatives. Data collected by the accounting 
department of Aalto University are used for the independent variables derived from balance 
sheets and profit and loss statements, as well as for the audit fees. Data regarding the 
authorization years of authorized public accountants were also provided by the accounting 
department and were further augmented by data graciously provided by PRH, the public 
body responsible for the authorization of auditors in Finland. Two samples are extracted 
from the data, with one concerning audits by all auditors (2389 firm-year observations), and 
the other concerning audits conducted by Big Four auditors (2201 observations). 
In this study, audit experience is defined on the basis of years elapsed between the end of 
the fiscal year under audit and the year in which the principal signee of the audit report 
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(hereafter ‘audit signee’) was authorized as a KHT auditor by PRH. This serves as a measure 
of the overall experience of the auditor, in contrast with measures related to client or industry 
specialization, or auditor tenure. Several regression models are constructed with different 
mathematical definitions of this experience variable in order to obtain a better understanding 
of the nature of its relationship with audit fees. Audit fees, in turn, are defined as the natural 
logarithm of fees in euros for the fiscal year to which the audited financial statements relate. 
Various control variables derived chiefly from balance sheet information as well as profit 
and loss statement line-items are incorporated into the models based on the findings of 
previous research and the theoretical investigation conducted herein. 
1.4 STRUCTURE 
The study comprises six main chapters. After the introduction, chapter two provides an 
overview of the financial statements audit process and its objectives with a view to audit 
quality and fees. Chapter three summarizes existing literature relating to audit experience 
and audit work as well as the construction of audit fee regression models. Chapter four 
discusses the data and study design in more detail. Chapter five reports the findings of the 
study. Finally, chapter six summarizes the results and their practical implications and offers 
some suggestions for potential avenues into future research.  
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2. THE AUDIT PROCESS AND AUDIT FEES 
This section provides an overview of the audit as a process to establish an understanding of 
what kind of a service is performed when an external audit of financial statements is 
conducted. The objectives of auditing are examined primarily through the lenses of agency-
theory and the norms governing the auditing profession. The audit process is then briefly 
described in order to establish the basis on which the impacts of audit experience can be 
evaluated. The formation of audit fees in the audit markets as a function of both supply and 
demand factors is analyzed thereafter.  Finally, audit quality is connected with the objectives 
of an audit to provide an understanding of how audit quality may mediate an association 
between audit experience and fees through both reputation and expertise. 
2.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF AN AUDIT AND AUDIT QUALITY 
2.1.1 The Purpose of External Audits 
The nature and scope of a financial statements audit vary across regions depending on the 
institutional and regulatory context. However, professional organizations have issued 
accounting and auditing standards, providing some degree of uniformity in the norms of the 
profession across national borders. In 2006, the European Union adopted directive 
2006/43/EC, whose provisions refer to some of the aforementioned standards. Article 26 of 
the directive stipulates that statutory auditors conduct their work in compliance with the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). The directive was enacted in Finnish legislation 
through the Auditing Act (1141/2015, chapter 3, section 3, subsection 1). The provisions of 
these standards, which contain definitions of an audit and its objectives, are therefore binding 
on Finnish auditors. Given that the aforementioned EU directive requires the implementation 
of the ISAs by all EU member states, i.e. they are widely recognized, they form a useful 
basis for understanding the purpose, scope, and nature of audit work. 
According to ISA 200 (IAASB 2018, p. 77), ‘the purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree 
of confidence of intended users in the financial statements.’ ISA 200 further states that this 
is done by the auditor communicating their opinion on ‘whether the financial statements are 
prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting 
framework.’ (ibid. 2018, p. 77). On a more tangible level this entails, according to IAASB 
(2018, p. 78), collecting through audit work ‘sufficient appropriate audit evidence about 
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whether material misstatements exist’. According to ISA 200, then, the auditor is to conduct 
an audit in which they collect evidence about possible material misstatements, and then 
communicate the results through an audit report. These definitions of objectives and the 
methods to achieve them center on ideas of increased trust, confidence, and accountability. 
As such, they are clearly articulated through the perspective of agency theory.  
Central to the agency theory is the principal-agent problem, according to which the interests 
of the agent may differ from the interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This 
could result in the agent acting in a way that is not beneficial to the principal. In an auditing 
context, the problem is that the management is tasked with stewardship of the shareholders’ 
assets, yet the two parties may have conflicting interests. Further exacerbating the problem, 
there is an asymmetry of information available to the management and owners, with the 
management generally having more information about the company’s finances and 
operations (Eilifsen et al. 2014, p. 6). This information asymmetry arises from the long-
recognized ‘separation of ownership and control’ in modern corporations (e.g. Berle & 
Means 1933, pp. 119-120; ICAEW 2005, p. 8). Consequently, the owners may have doubts 
about the actions of management and the reliability of their reports.  
It may be beneficial to both parties to reduce this information asymmetry (Eilifsen et al. 
2014, p. 6; Watkins et al. 2004). As Eilifsen et al. (2014) further argue, an unmitigated 
information risk, that is, the risk that the information is not reliable, might otherwise be 
factored into the managers’ compensation. Thus, the independent auditor is brought in to 
provide a monitoring service aimed at increasing the credibility of the reports (ICAEW 2005; 
Watkins et al. 2004). Whittington and Pany (2006, p. 6) make the further point that 
information risk can arise out of both unintentional misstatements and intentional 
manipulation of the reports.  From the agency theory perspective, then, the audit is not solely 
meant to prevent deliberate manipulation in the management’s reporting. 
The principal-agent problem results in so-called agency costs. These are expenses arising 
from the potential conflicts of interest in this relationship and costs incurred to prevent them. 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) Conceptualized through agency theory, audit fees can then be 
seen as agency costs. DeAngelo (1981a) suggests that among different alternatives, audited 
financial statements can be a relatively cost-efficient way to reduce agency costs. Based on 
observations of the various legislative regimes and the widespread adoption of the ISAs and 
IFRSs across the globe today, this appears to be a prevalent notion.  
9 
 
Stating the objectives of an audit from the perspective of agency theory gives, however, only 
a limited view of the reasons behind the demand of audit services. Demand arises not just 
out of a perceived necessity for owners to monitor their agents, but also simply as a product 
of regulatory requirements of audited financial statements (e.g. the Finnish Auditing Act 
1141/2015). This is certainly the case in the Finnish business environment, where even 
relatively small entities have to procure an auditor’s opinion on their financial statements 
(Niemi 2004). The Auditing Act (1141/2015 chapter 2, section 2, subsection 2) sets out the 
thresholds for the size of a company’s operations that, if exceeded, mandate a statutory audit. 
These regulatory requirements are largely due to the fact that financial statements serve 
various purposes that are not necessarily directly linked to the owners of private companies 
(e.g. Government proposal HE 70/2016, p. 5, relating to the implementation of EU directive 
2014/56/EU in the Finnish legislation). The government proposal outlines several purposes 
for auditing, including the prevention of black markets, promoting competition and stability 
of the markets, assurance of the financials of public bodies, among others. Whittington and 
Pany (2006, p. 7) point out that creditors may require that a company’s financial statements 
are audited as a prerequisite for financing. Additionally, tax authorities may have a keen 
interest on financial reporting, as audited financial statements serve as the basis for 
calculating taxable income in many regulatory environments. For instance, the Finnish legal 
act governing the taxation of business income (1968/360, Finnish: Laki elinkeinotulon 
verottamisesta) has many ties to the applicable accounting legislation.  
Clearly, then, the demand for audit services is connected to various different interests. 
However, common to all of these is the desire for financial reporting that provides relevant, 
accurate and reliable information about a company’s finances, its operations, and its 
governance. The auditor’s role in all of this is, as discussed above, adding credibility to this 
information. The agency theory perspective therefore provides a useful understanding of 
what an audit is to achieve, and consequently, what determines the quality of an audit. This 
is also essential for understanding the fees an auditor is able to charge for their work.  
2.1.2 Defining Audit Quality 
An examination of the potential connection between audit experience and audit fees entails 
establishing an understanding of what is meant by the term ‘audit quality’. The quality of 
audits and the definition of quality have been a topic of much debate and research following 
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the big corporate accounting scandals of the early 21st century, yet no firm consensus has 
been achieved with respect to the definition of the term (DeFond & Zhang 2014; IAASB 
2014, p. 2). Based on the earlier discussion of the objectives of an audit, one might draw the 
conclusion that a quality audit is simply one that most increases the accuracy and credibility 
of financial reporting. However, this formulation is somewhat ambiguous especially with 
regard to the latter characteristic. A particularly influential definition of audit quality by 
DeAngelo (1981a) sheds some light on this matter: 
“The quality of audit services is defined to be the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s 
accounting system, and (b) report the breach.” (DeAngelo 1981a, p. 186). 
 
This definition starts from the subjective assessment of the markets. It also hinges on the 
auditor’s independence, as it is not sufficient for the auditor merely to discover, but also to 
report detected breaches. According to this definition, the perceived competence and 
independence, i.e. perceptions regarding the characteristics of the auditor, are the central 
components of audit quality (Watkins et al. 2004). Yet, prevalent as it is in the literature, this 
definition hasn’t gone entirely without criticism. DeFond and Zhang (2014, pp. 280-281) 
argue that it reduces the auditor’s role into detection and reporting based on mere technical 
compliance with regulations, and thereby understates the auditor’s role in ensuring faithful 
representation of the firm’s finances and operations. They further argue that ensuring faithful 
representation is also mandated by auditing standards and US Supreme rulings, noting that 
the auditor is at risk of litigation even when technical compliance with accounting norms is 
ensured. Additionally, as Tritschler (2014, p. 10) points out, DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition 
does not permit direct measurement of quality, making use of various proxy measurements 
necessary. The inability to observe audit quality has also been noted by many others (e.g. 
DeFond & Zhang 2014; Watkins et al 2004; Francis 2004).  
Some commentators have proposed assessing audit quality as compliance with auditing 
norms. Proponents of this view argue that an audit is of high quality when the relevant norms 
are complied with in conducting the audit (PCAOB 2015, p. 10; Tritschler 2014, p. 10), with 
some scholars having adopted this approach in their research (e.g. Krishnan & Schauer 
2000). Francis (2011) contends that such an approach is also implied by auditing standards. 
A benefit of this view is that it renders audit quality measurable. Measures that capture 
deviations from accounting and auditing norms could then be viewed as evidence of audit 
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quality. This view appears, however, to be even more vulnerable to the same criticisms as 
DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition, as it certainly reduces the concept of quality to the mere 
technical observation of regulation. The normative view on audit quality does not permit 
differences in audit quality in cases where the applicable norms are followed and the issued 
audit report is held constant. This assertion is clearly untenable, at least if the main purpose 
of an audit is viewed through agency theory as that of enhancing the credibility of the reports 
and reducing the principals’ information risk. Regulation is thus more aptly viewed as an 
instrumental device towards these ends, rather than as an end per se. 
2.2 THE AUDIT AS A PROCESS 
To understand how an auditor’s experience may affect audit fees, one must first look at the 
audit as a process during which costs are incurred and an auditor’s professional judgement 
is frequently exercised, and expertise applied. The level of assurance provided can therefore 
be expected to vary depending on the inputs to the process (Francis 2011; Knechel et al. 
2009). Causholli et al. (2010) note, however, that many previous studies have treated the 
level of assurance provided as being a fixed attribute of a given audit firm (e.g. O’Keefe et 
al. 1994a; Simunic 1980). If audit quality is conceived of as the level of assurance provided, 
congruent with agency theory and DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition, then differential pricing 
across audit engagements resulting from differences in quality may emerge. It is therefore 
important to understand the audit as process, as the quality of the inputs into the process may 
affect audit quality, and consequently, fees. 
The scope of an audit, on a regulatory level, is dictated by international auditing standards 
and national legislation. According to the Finnish Auditing Act (1141/2015 chapter 3, 
section 1, subsection 1) an audit covers ‘the accounting records, the financial statements, 
and the governance of a corporation or a foundation for the financial year’. An audit 
conducted in compliance with the Auditing Act (1141/2015) therefore has to entail 
procedures directed at each of the aforementioned objects.  
From a technical perspective, an audit of financial statements can be described as a process 
in which the auditor gathers evidence regarding the management assertions presented in the 
financial statements in order to issue an audit report on whether the financial statements are 
presented in accordance with predetermined criteria (Eilifsen et al. 2014, p. 12; Whittington 
& Pany 2006, pp. 5-6). ‘Management assertions’ here refer to the implied or stated claims 
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about the correctness of the information in the financial statements. The ‘predetermined 
criteria’ refer to any legislation and other norms that constitute the applicable financial 
reporting framework. This process leads to the audit report that accompanies the financial 
statements, which communicates the auditor’s opinion of the correspondence between 
management assertions and the predetermined criteria (Eilifsen et al. 2014, p. 13; 
Whittington & Pany 2006, p. 5; IAASB 2018, p. 79). Implicit or explicit within the auditor’s 
report is that the auditor has obtained a reasonable level of assurance to base their opinion 
on. A reasonable level of assurance is, according to IAASB (2018, pp. 78 & 82), ‘a high but 
not absolute’ level of assurance. Worth noting again is that the level of assurance is not 
directly measurable, and that it may therefore vary between engagements, even with the 
resulting audit opinion held constant.  
The goal of an audit, according to agency theory, is then to enhance confidence in the 
financial statements by reducing information risk. Audit work therefore consists largely of 
various procedures aimed at obtaining audit evidence regarding management assertions so 
that the auditor can ultimately express an opinion on the financial statements (Eilifsen et al 
2014, p. 19). However, the audit process also entails many other stages before the auditor 
can start gathering evidence. Ibid. (2014, p. 18) divide the audit process into seven major 
phases, as illustrated below in figure 1. 
Figure 1 – The Major Phases of an Audit. Adapted from Eilifsen et al. (2014, p. 18). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the audit process includes several steps where an auditor’s 
expertise could have a considerable effect on the outcome. Causholli and Knechel (2012, p. 
631) further boil audit work down to two activities: risk assessment as well as planning and 
executing audit procedures. These two activities play a crucial part in all of the steps outlined 
by Eilifsen et al. (2014). Beginning from client acceptance/continuance, the auditor has to 
assess the client’s risk profile, as this in turn influences the auditor’s risks. Further steps 
include obtaining an understanding of the business, the client’s internal controls as well as 
the business environment the client operates in so as to plan effective audit procedures. 
(Whittington & Pany 2006, p. 127-128) The scope of the audit therefore relies heavily on 
the decisions made in the initial stages of the audit. After planning, the auditor executes 
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procedures to obtain evidence regarding the assertions in the financial statements. (Causholli 
& Knechel 2012) The audit is then completed, which entails the determination of whether 
the collected evidence is sufficient and appropriate. Finally, the auditor forms their opinion 
and decides upon what kind of an audit report to issue. (Whittington & Pany 2006, p. 6) 
As discussed above, the auditor’s professional judgement enters into many decisions taken 
during an audit, which may affect the resultant quality of the audit. Causholli and Knechel 
(2012) argue that the audit’s scope is ultimately decided through the auditor’s professional 
judgement, while noting the complexity of this task. Francis (2011) also asserts that quality 
depends on the inputs of the process, that is, the competence and independence of the audit 
team as well as the appropriate use and evaluation of testing procedures, throughout the 
audit. Thus, it seems likely that an auditor’s expertise, accumulated through experience, 
plays a part in the execution of the process, as well as the outcome, i.e. the level of assurance 
achieved. Consequently, this might lead to observable effects in audit fees if clients are 
willing to pay for higher audit quality. 
2.3 AUDIT WORK, THE MARKET FOR AUDITS, AND AUDIT FEES 
The various factors influencing audit quality and audit fees can be broadly divided into 
production (supply) and demand factors (Causholli et al. 2010; DeFond & Zhang 2014). As 
Causholli et al. (2010) note, audit fees reflect, in part, the cost of delivering audit services. 
A brief overview of the supply and demand factors affecting audit pricing is therefore 
provided. 
As discussed in chapter 2.2, an audit engagement is, as a production function, a multi-stage 
process that entails the expenditure of time and effort by the auditors. Simunic (1980, p. 161) 
broadly described audit fees as ‘the product of unit price and the quantity of audit services 
demanded by the management of the audited company’. Causholli et al. (2010) further point 
out that the main costs of an audit are labor costs. In addition, the auditor may of course 
utilize other resources, such as technological tools in their work. 
The process cost of an audit engagement is therefore highly dependent on how the various 
stages of the audit are executed and how much labor is used therein. In line with Simunic 
(1980) and Causholli et al. (2010), Knechel et al. (2009) argue that the efficiency of audit 
work may be expected to affect audit quality. On a similar note, it seems likely that efficient 
auditors could alternatively provide the same degree of assurance but at a lower cost, perhaps 
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passing some of these savings onto the client. For instance, Bills et al. (2015) studied the 
impacts of auditor industry specialization on audit fees, and found specialists to charge lower 
fees without compromising quality, suggesting that cost-efficiencies were passed onto the 
clients to establish a competitive edge.  
Yet, the determination fees cannot solely rest on factors related to the production of audit 
services. Causholli et al. (2010) asserted that previous research on audit production has been 
scarce compared to the literature on fees due to the limited availability of data regarding 
production inputs, i.e. labor hours. Knechel and Willekens (2006) further argued that fees 
had been treated as by-product of production, while neglecting the demand side. In either 
case, audit fees are likely to also be influenced by factors relating to demand (Defond & 
Zhang 2014).  
The basic principles of the demand for audit services were outlined previously in chapter 2.1 
through agency theory. However, audit fees are also related to market conditions as well as 
the characteristics of the client (Causholli et al. 2010), which may influence demand. For 
instance, Knechel and Willekens (2006) investigated the drivers of the demand for audit 
services in listed companies in Belgium. They concluded that demand drivers relating to the 
internal controls, risk management practices, and corporate governance of the client were 
positively associated with fees. The characteristics of a particular auditee’s demand for 
auditing may thus influence audit pricing.  
Additionally, market conditions are also likely to affect the determination of prices. The 
audit markets for large enterprises tend to be highly concentrated in developed economies 
(e.g. Abidin et al. 2010; GAO 2008; GAO 2003; PRH 2016). As such, some have expressed 
doubts about whether this has resulted in oligopolistic pricing among the Big Four auditors. 
Yet, the evidence does not seem to support such a conclusion (Abidin et al. 2010; GAO 
2008). In the EU, mandatory audit firm rotation imposed by Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 
may also have some effects on audit pricing. For instance, it has been proposed by some 
scholars as well as audit firms that such rotation rules result in increased costs as the new 
auditor has to familiarize themselves with the client (e.g. DeAngelo 1981b; KPMG 2017; 
Kwon et al. 2014). Additionally, many researches have noted a so called ‘low balling’ 
phenomenon in the first years of an audit, where auditors provide audits at a lower price for 
competitive reasons (e.g. DeAngelo 1981b; Fung et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2015; Kwon et al. 
2014; Simon & Francis 1988). Consequently, market conditions can impact audit fees in 
15 
 
many ways that are not necessarily related directly to the auditor’s production capabilities 
or even the client’s attributes. 
The production and demand factors also appear to be interrelated to an important degree 
(DeFond & Zhang 2014). As the study of Knechel and Willekens (2006) illustrates, these 
demand factors ultimately influence what precisely is produced by the auditor. Prior studies 
also indicate that auditor effort, measured in hours of labor, is affected by client 
characteristics, although the evidence is mixed with respect to some characteristics 
(Causholli et al. 2010). It therefore appears that the characteristics of clients may result in 
differences in both audit hour and fees.  
Audit fees, then, are determined on the markets based on factors relating to both the 
production of audit services and the demand thereof. These factors may be mutually 
interdependent. Audit efficiency may affect fees, as the level of assurance achieved is likely 
tied to the amount of assurance an auditor can provide per unit of labor. Additionally, it may 
be the case that efficiency produces cost savings that could be passed onto the audit clients. 
If audit experience is linked to audit efficiency, for instance through expertise and 
professional judgement, an auditor’s overall experience may therefore impact audit fees 
through production costs. A further investigation of the relationship between audit fees and 
quality is therefore conducted in the next section, with a view to how they may be linked to 
the audit experience of individual auditors. 
2.4 AUDIT QUALITY AND AUDIT FEES 
The relationship between quality and fees appears to be complex. Fees are often used as a 
proxy measurement for audit quality, as prior tends to support to such an approach (DeFond 
& Zhang 2014; Francis 2004). The intuitive logic behind this approach is quite simple. As 
Francis (2004, p. 352) puts it, a higher price may imply greater auditor expertise or greater 
effort. Since audit quality can logically be expected to be one of the main factors mediating 
any potential association between the signee’s overall experience and audit fees, an 
examination of the relationship between quality and fees is warranted as one of the two links 
in the suggested causal chain. 
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2.4.1 The Connection Between Quality and Fees 
Because of the measurement difficulties entailed by DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition of audit 
quality, various divergent views on how audit quality is to be measured have emerged (for 
an overview of common audit quality models, see DeFond and Zhang’s [2014] 
comprehensive literature review). This also complicates investigations of the relationship 
between an auditor’s experience and audit fees.  
Convincingly establishing a causal relationship between experience and fees through audit 
quality faces several difficulties: First, this would require that quality is actually measurable 
in a sufficiently objective manner, and second, that a non-spurious association between 
experience and quality is established, and finally, that market perceptions of quality reflect 
actual quality. Thus, previously conducted studies on auditor industry specialization or 
behavioral research on the effects of an auditor’s experience on task-specific performance 
cannot be taken directly to imply that higher levels of experience cause higher audit fees 
through better quality. 
In spite of these issues, audit fees are often understood as implying higher audit quality 
(DeFond & Zhang 2014; Francis 2004; Hay 2013). As discussed earlier in chapter 2.1.2, 
using proxy measures is inevitable if DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition is accepted, as is often 
the case in audit literature. However, fees may also reflect factors not captured by certain 
proxies of quality that start from the assumption that higher financial reporting quality 
follows from higher audit quality.  
Watkins et al. (2004) argue that perceived quality and the auditor’s actual ‘monitoring 
strength’ aren’t always matched. Thus, it is conceivable that the auditor’s reputation 
influences fees, even if their reputation is not aligned with their monitoring strength. Such a 
delineation between perceptions and actual quality has also been suggested by others (e.g. 
Lowensohn et al. 2007; Ghosh & Moon 2005). However, Watkins et al. (2004) also note that 
perceptions of quality and actual monitoring strength should ultimately converge ‘as 
information is revealed’. They illustrate this by pointing to the downfall of Arthur Andersen 
LLP, where a reputable auditor delivered low quality, the discovery of which ultimately 
precipitated their demise. Watkins et al. (2014), however, make the caveat that further 
research into this relationship is still necessary, while also calling for a definition of quality 
that takes into account the differences between actual quality and perceptions of it. 
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Watkins et al. (2004) conceive an auditor’s reputation as a characteristic of the firm, which 
serves to enhance perceptions of the credibility of financial reports. Perhaps, then, the same 
might be true of individual audit signees, at least in smaller markets where an individual 
reputation might be easier to establish. In a related vein, Francis (2004) also argued that 
public perceptions of audit quality seemed, at the time, to be impaired due to suspicions 
about the effects of providing non-audit services to audit clients, even as the actual quality 
of audits was by many measures quite high. Thus, a discrepancy may also be suggested on 
a more general level. This, however, seems unlikely to have any causal effect on the fees 
obtained from individual audit engagements. 
If the arguments regarding the convergence presented by Watkins et al. (2004) hold true, the 
case for audit fees as a proxy for quality would be strengthened, regardless of how audit 
quality is ultimately defined. If market perceptions of quality and monitoring strength were 
to fully converge, then audit fees would likely reflect both of these aspects of quality. This 
convergence might also lead to convergence between the auditor’s reputation for quality as 
well as their actual independence and competence, that is, convergence between the 
characteristics of the auditor (see Figure 2 below). However, these arguments cannot be 
accepted without reservations. For instance, perhaps minor discrepancies may go 
undiscovered. The regulatory and supervisory context may also affect the likelihood of 
discovery. The calls for further research on this topic by Lowensohn et al. (2007) and 
Watkins et al. (2004) must therefore be echoed here. 
In spite of such questions, the argument for converge does seem to have some merit, at least 
with regard to major discrepancies, as illuminated by Andersen’s downfall. It further seems 
likely that there is some degree of information flow between those personally involved in 
the auditing process and the stakeholders of the client. Such information could notify the 
purchasers of audit services of potential deficiencies in audit quality. Thus, it is proposed 
here that market perceptions of audit quality are highly correlated with commonly used 
measures of monitoring strength, such as discretionary accruals. Assuming that market 
perceptions of quality and monitoring strength are closely related, Figure 2 summarizes the 
potential relationship between audit experience and audit fees, based in part on the 
framework of quality proposed by Watkins et al. (2004, p. 157). 
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Figure 2 – The Effect of Audit Experience on Audit Quality and Fees 
 
Figure 2 clarifies the pathways through which an auditor’s experience may affect audit 
quality and consequently audit fees via both reputation as well as actual competence and 
independence. The figure also illustrates how these effects may be different for the 
stakeholders of the auditee as well as the auditor depending on whether the effect is mediated 
by reputation or actual competence and independence. Additionally, the figure depicts how 
positive stakeholder outcomes influence market perceptions and thereby the auditor’s 
reputation. Further worth noting here is that both monitoring strength and perceived quality 
affect audit fees, with differential fees potentially arising depending on the specific pathway 
thorough which experience affects quality.  
As Watkins et al. (2004) argued, this gap between monitoring strength and perceptions 
thereof may converge over the long term as information regarding audit outcomes comes to 
light. It is also proposed here that this convergence will then be related to the auditors, with 
the result that their reputation will increasingly match their competence and independence 
over time. Unlike Watkins et al. (2004), these pathways are argued to relate to both 
individual auditors as well as audit firms. In a smaller market with less auditors, such an 
effect might be more pronounced, as an individual reputation may be easier to establish. 
However, it should be noted that it is logically impossible for information regarding audit 
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engagements to be immediately reflected in market perceptions. Consequently, some 
discrepancy should always remain. 
The outcomes of an audit, illustrated in Figure 2, have to be evaluated with a view to the 
purposes of an external audit. The purpose of the audit, from the perspective of agency 
theory, is to reduce the information risk that arises from the principal-agent relationship. 
Information risk was defined in chapter 2.1 as the risk that the principal bases their decisions 
on information that is not reliable, based on the characterization of Eilifsen et al. (2014, p. 
6). If audit quality is perceived as being high while actual monitoring strength is low, the 
risk that decisions are made on bad information is evident. Whether audit experience relates 
merely to perceptions of quality or actual monitoring strength may therefore be important to 
differentiate as inquiries are made into the relationship between experience and fees. 
Despite this ambiguity in defining audit quality, several studies have found various measures 
of quality, relating to either reputational factors or more directly to monitoring strength, to 
be associated with higher fees. For instance, Choi et al. (2010) found audit firm office size 
to be positively associated with higher audit quality, as measured by abnormal accruals, and 
audit fees, suggesting that larger offices provide higher quality and obtain a premium for it. 
Dao et al. (2012) found that companies in which auditor selection requires shareholder 
ratification have higher audit fees and lower abnormal accruals as well as a lower likelihood 
of restatements. An earlier study by Choi et al. (2008, pp. 88-93) found a significant (p< 
0.01) Big Four price premium with all of the several variants of their regression model. They 
also found some ‘preliminary evidence’ that the Big Four auditors expend more effort as 
measured by labor hours, suggesting that this increased effort is factored into their audit fees. 
Francis et al. (2005) and Fung et al. (2012) studied audit fees in the U.S. audit market and 
found their measures of audit firm industry specialization, which implies higher quality, to 
be associated with higher fees. In the Finnish audit market, Niemi (2004) found evidence of 
higher fees for auditors who had more overall experience, higher level of auditor 
certification, level of education and audit firm size among smaller auditors. As a whole, then, 
the literature appears to suggest that audit clients do indeed place financial value on higher 
audit quality. 
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2.4.2 Implications for Studies of Audit Experience and Audit Fees 
Bearing in mind the limitations laid out above, DeAngelo’s (1981a) view on audit quality 
serves as the foundation for understanding audit quality in this study. Yet, the distinction 
between perceived quality and monitoring strength made by Watkins et al. (2004) and others 
seems highly relevant for an investigation of audit experience and audit fees. An individual 
auditor’s experience may be correlated with both their expertise and their reputation in the 
audit market. As discussed above, reputation relates more directly to perceptions of quality 
rather than actual monitoring strength. Therefore, if an individual auditor’s reputation is 
causally linked to higher audit fees, audit fees as a proxy for quality may provide less insight 
into the auditor’s actual monitoring strength. Regardless, market perceptions of quality are 
important per se. As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2000) has noted, 
perceptions of quality increase investor confidence. The same view is also evident in 
IESBA’s (2018, p. 29) ethical standards’ definition of the term ‘independence in 
appearance’. 
Adopting DeAngelo’s (1981a) market-based view on quality allows for an investigation of 
the relationship between experience and fees, which bypasses the problem of relating 
experience to either perceived quality or monitoring strength. Audit fees are determined on 
the markets, and thus likely based largely on perceptions of quality. As discussed previously, 
these perceptions are likely to be affected by actual monitoring strength via positive 
outcomes for stakeholders and information flow between auditors and their clients. Such an 
approach, however, imposes a crucial limitation for the study: the regression models 
estimated in this study cannot firmly substantiate any causal claims made regarding the 
impacts of audit experience on quality, if it is conceived of as monitoring strength. 
Disentangling the effects of monitoring strength and perceived quality thus appears to be a 
crucial, yet challenging, task for fully understanding the formation of audit fees. 
In spite of these limitations, such an empirical investigation as is conducted in this study 
may still be useful, as long as the results are interpreted with care. At the very least, evidence 
of a potential association between experience and fees may be suggestive of whether 
experience affects audit quality. Additionally, an association with fees is important in its 
own right. However, the design of the study does not allow for the disentanglement of factors 
relating to reputation and actual monitoring strength. A theory-based investigation of audit 
experience and its potential effects on audit work is thus conducted in the following section. 
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3. THE EFFECT OF AUDIT EXPERIENCE ON AUDIT FEES 
An examination of the effect of audit experience on audit fees entails connecting the potential 
effects of audit experience to the quality of audit work. As discussed in chapter 2, market 
perceptions of quality are likely to be connected with auditor monitoring strength to a high 
degree. Therefore, it may be proposed that the manner in which the experience of an 
individual audit signee affects their work may have an impact on monitoring strength, and 
consequently on market perceptions of quality as well as audit fees. However, relatively little 
research has been conducted on how the personal characteristics of an auditor may affect 
quality (Cahan & Sun 2015; Garcia-Blandon & Argiles-Bosch 2018; Gul et al. 2013). As 
Cahan and Sun (2015) note, this is especially true of archival research on the effects of the 
experience of an individual auditor. Furthermore, research directly examining the effects of 
an individual audit signee’s reputation on perceived quality and fees appears to be scarce or 
non-existent. An examination of experience as it relates to audit quality through actual 
monitoring strength will therefore have to suffice here. 
In the following, an overview of existing literature concerning audit experience, expertise, 
and their impacts on the different stages of the audit process is provided. Afterwards, some 
propositions based on this research are made in order to conceptualize the potential 
connections between experience and audit fees. Finally, some of the models used to estimate 
audit fees in previous literature are examined, and a brief summary of the practical 
implications of the examinations conducted here is provided. 
3.1 AUDIT EXPERIENCE AND AUDIT EXPERTISE 
Audit experience has been conceptualized in various different ways. Many have studied the 
impacts of partner tenure in a given engagement (e.g. Bedard & Johnstone 2010; Chi et al. 
2009; Ghosh & Moon 2005; Manry et al. 2008) or audit firm engagement tenure (Carcello 
& Nagy 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Gul et al. 2009) to understand how the auditor’s relationship 
with the client may affect the audit’s outcomes. 
Additionally, the effects of the auditor’s specialization have also been a topic of much 
interest (e.g. Knechel et al. 2007; Low 2004; Reichelt & Wang 2010; Zerni 2012). These 
studies have focused largely on the expertise provided by specializing in an industry or a 
client, at the levels of the individual auditor, audit firm, and the office versus national-level 
specialization within an audit firm. Insofar as expertise is connected with experience, such 
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studies may provide valuable insights into how an auditor’s experience may affect audit 
work. 
 A third stream of research has consisted of behavioral studies examining the effects of audit 
experience on performance in certain tasks often encountered in the audit process (e.g. 
Abdolmohammadi & Wright 1987; Bonner & Lewis 1990; Davis 1996; Libby & Frederick 
1990; Moeckel 1990). Although studies of audit signee or audit firm tenure have also sought 
to address issues of independence, among other things, a commonality to all of these bodies 
of research is that they are concerned with how an auditor’s expertise may impact the 
outcomes of an audit. However, none of these are directly concerned with how an auditor’s 
overall experience may influence audit quality or fees on the level of a whole audit 
engagement.  
Yet, some insight into the potential effects audit experience may have on quality and fees 
might still be gained through these bodies of research. Thus, an overview of prior research 
on the impacts of experience on audit work is provided here, with particular attention given 
to the behavioral studies, as they most directly relate to the objectives of this study. The 
connections between experience, industry specialization, auditor tenure, audit quality and 
fees are also considered.  
3.1.1 Behavioral Research on Audit Experience and Expertise 
Many studies have investigated the impacts of audit experience on specific tasks that relate 
to the audit process, although most of them date back to the 1980’s and 1990’s.  These studies 
have focused on topics such as audit judgements with and task complexity 
(Abdolmohammadi & Wright 1987), information selection (Davis 1996), assessments of 
audit findings (Libby & Frederick 1990) and knowledge of error frequencies and error causes 
(Ashton 1991), and memory errors (Moeckel 1990). Most of the aforementioned studies 
found either mixed results or positive associations with experience and performance on the 
task of interest. Yet, as Bonner and Lewis (1990) noted, the link between experience and 
expertise is not unequivocal.  
Several different audit tasks to which expertise might relate have been identified. Bonner 
and Lewis (1990) pointed out the need to analyze expertise on a level that goes deeper than 
general knowledge of the domain in question, as they argued that more specific knowledge 
is likely to vary across auditors with a given amount of experience. To this end, they (Ibid., 
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pp. 3-6) identified three types of knowledge relevant for auditor expertise: (1) general 
domain knowledge, (2) subspecialty knowledge of clients or industries, and (3) general 
business knowledge. They also noted that, as a prerequisite for expertise, the auditor has to 
possess some innate general problem-solving ability. Their research setting utilized four 
tasks intended to measure different types of knowledge and ability. These tasks were related 
to (1) identifying errors resulting from deficient internal controls, (2) analysis of the causes 
of deviant financial ratios, (3) identifying earnings manipulation, and (4) identifying interest-
rate swaps and knowledge of their accounting treatment. In their experiment experience was 
observed to have a positive association with performance. However, they argued that the 
evidence also suggested that knowledge and innate ability may be better predictors of 
performance than experience. 
Consequently, Bonner and Lewis (1990) conclude that experience as a measure of expertise 
is problematic in that it doesn’t allow examination of differences among auditors with a 
given level of experience. As this study is focused on the effects of experience on a general 
level, this does not present a major problem. Furthermore, Marchant (1990) presented 
criticisms of Bonner and Lewis’ (1990) propositions regarding the definition of expertise as 
well as the methods and conclusions of their study. He argued that their definition does not 
address the question of how superior task-specific performance is achieved, pointing to the 
fact that experience facilitates acquiring knowledge, and that it is therefore not surprising to 
observe lower explanatory power for experience if knowledge is factored into the model 
separately.  
Marchant’s (1990) arguments are consistent with the findings of Libby and Tan (1994), who 
extended work of Bonner and Lewis as well as Libby & Luft (1993, cited in Libby & Tan 
1994) by developing the framework and running additional tests on Bonner and Lewis’ 
(1990) data. Libby and Tan (1994) concluded that experience had a direct impact only on 
performance on structured tasks, but that experience also had an impact on the development 
of knowledge relevant to performance on each of the four tasks. Even so, the classification 
of the three types of knowledge presented by Bonner and Lewis (1990) may prove useful in 
understanding the potential impacts of experience, as all three types seem likely to be 
connected with overall experience, albeit in different ways. Overall, Bonner and Lewis’ 
(1990) and Libby and Tan’s (1994) studies give some support to the proposition that overall 
experience increases performance on specific tasks, whether directly, or mediated by 
knowledge acquisition. 
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Other studies have mainly focused on one or two specific tasks, while refraining from 
drawing such general conclusions as Bonner and Lewis (1990). Abdolmohammadi and 
Wright (1987) studied whether experience affects decision-making in tasks of varying 
degrees of complexity. They found experience to be positively associated with performance 
in unstructured and semi-structured tasks, i.e., tasks of medium or high degree of complexity.  
Davis (1996), on the other hand, studied the impacts of knowledge afforded by situational 
experience through an examination of control-risk assessments made by auditors with 
varying amounts of experience in the Big Six audit firms. He found that experienced seniors 
were better at selecting relevant information and made faster and more consistent control 
risk assessments, but that their judgements were not more accurate than those of new seniors. 
His results therefore suggest that more experienced auditors may be more efficient, if not 
effective, in judging the client’s internal controls.  
Hypothesizing that experienced auditors are more likely to detect and more efficient in 
detecting as well as evaluating financial statements errors, Libby and Frederick (1990) 
conducted an experiment comparing audit managers, audit staff and auditing students. They 
interpreted their evidence as pointing to experienced auditors having a broader knowledge 
of potential errors and better assessments of their frequency as well as a better ability to 
identify related errors within the same transaction-cycle due to more developed knowledge 
structures. With respect to knowledge of error frequency, Kaplan et al. (1992), however, 
found differences relating to experience only when managers were grouped together with 
seniors and students were grouped together with associates, but no differences when 
analyzed as individual groups corresponding to these ranks. Their evidence can be 
interpreted as providing only weak support for experience-related gains in knowledge of 
error frequencies. 
Ashton (1991) extended the studies on error evaluations by examining auditors’ knowledge 
of the frequencies of potential errors in financial statements and knowledge of their causes 
as well as effects. In line with Kaplan et al. (1992), she did not find experience to be strongly 
associated with more accurate assessments of error frequencies. She proposed that a likely 
explanation for these results was that errors in the financial statements were, in general, rare 
and that auditors therefore had little experience of them. Additionally, the evidence 
suggested at best a weak positive association for the number of the auditor’s clients in an 
industry, and at worst, a negative correlation for an auditor’s months of experience with 
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respect to accuracy in assessments of error causes and error effects. Ashton (1991) therefore 
concluded, in accordance with Bonner and Lewis (1990), that experience of specific audit 
tasks is likely a better measure of expertise than overall experience. However, it is worth 
pointing out again, that overall experience is of course likely to be associated with experience 
of any given audit task, thereby facilitating the acquisition of task-specific expertise (Libby 
& Tan 1994; Marchant 1990). In addition, the sample sizes in Ashton’s (1991) study cannot 
be considered sufficiently large to draw definite conclusions. The evidence obtained by 
Ashton, however, do cast some doubts on validity of Libby and Frederick ‘s (1990) results. 
On the other hand, a more recent study by Yen (2012) studied the judgements made by staff-
level auditors of varying amounts of experience in analytical review tasks. He found that 
staff-level auditors were more able to generate alternative explanations of analytical review 
findings than auditing students. Taken as a whole, the evidence regarding error-rate 
knowledge of experienced auditors therefore has to be considered mixed. 
Moeckel (1990) studied the effects of experience on memory errors made by auditors 
classified into four levels of experience, from assistant to manger. She found that (1) 
experienced auditors are less likely to fail to integrate, that is, make connections between 
different pieces of information, and (2) that experienced auditors were more likely to alter 
(reconstruct) their mental representations of information in order to better fit it to previously 
existing memories. She further argued that the experienced auditors’ reconstruction of 
mental representations may result in failures to integrate as well as inability to detect such 
failures made by their subordinates, thus potentially offsetting the benefits of better 
integration. Consequently, Moeckel’s evidence also has to be considered mixed with regard 
to the effects of experience on the performance of audit work.  
Few studies have studied more specifically how learning might occur over time in an 
auditing context. However, as suggested by the framework of Libby and Tan (1994), Bonner 
and Walker (1994) studied the acquisition of knowledge as one of the determinants of 
performance. They found that practice combined with explanatory feedback or instruction 
relating to understanding rules beforehand improves acquisition of task-specific knowledge 
that translates to higher performance in ratio analysis tasks. However, if any of these 
conditions were violated, knowledge was not acquired. Additionally, they found that general 
ability facilitated knowledge acquisition. Their results can be taken to lend support for some 
degree of knowledge acquisition through experience in auditing. Yet, as Bonner and Walker 
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(1994) point out, outcome feedback may often be unavailable in the auditing environment, 
thus weakening such an assumption. 
Shaub and Lawrence (2002, as cited in Nelson 2009) studied the connection between 
experience and an auditor’s professional skepticism among Big Five auditors in fraud-
assessment tasks. They found the most skeptic auditors to be those with the least experience, 
suggesting that skepticism declines with experience. This is problematic for audit quality, as 
exercising professional skepticism is considered an integral part of auditor independence 
(IESBA 2018, p. 29-31). Nelson (2009) noted that Shaub and Lawrence’s findings were 
consistent with previous studies which suggested that experienced auditors are more likely 
to ascribe non-error explanations to potential misstatements. For instance, Kaplan et al. 
(1992) found that when auditors were given a list of potential explanations in an analytical 
review ratio analysis task, more experienced auditors were likelier to attribute the variances 
to environmental explanations rather than errors in the financial statements. Yet, Shaub and 
Lawrence (2002, cited in Nelson 2009) argue that excessive skepticism may also be harmful 
in that it might reduce efficiency if it prompts unwarranted action. The question then 
becomes whether the experienced auditors’ lesser skepticism is warranted due to concerns 
of efficiency or does this compromise their ability to provide high quality audits. Here too it 
must be concluded that experience may have an equivocal relationship with audit quality. 
Owhoso et al. (2002) studied error detection by senior auditors and managers in industry-
specialized teams and non-specialized teams. They further divided these teams into nominal 
teams, where seniors and managers worked alone and their error detection results were 
combined, and real teams, where seniors and managers worked together through a sequential 
review process. They found managers to be more likely to identify conceptual errors and 
seniors more likely to identify mechanical errors, within real industry-specialized teams. 
This was also true of specialized managers and seniors working individually. Non-
specialized seniors and managers, however, were significantly worse at both tasks, and the 
differences between managers and seniors were reduced as compared with specialized 
teams. Their findings lend further support to Ashton (1991) as well as Bonner and Lewis 
(1990), who suggested that more specific experience, rather than overall experience, may be 
important for audit performance.  
To summarize, previous research has found an auditor’s experience to be positively 
associated with performance on some audit related tasks whereas mixed or contrary evidence 
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has been presented with regard to others. As noted by Bonner and Lewis (1990), the link 
between experience and expertise does not appear to be a direct one in all cases. Thus, 
experience relating to more specific tasks may be a better predictor of expertise, as also 
suggested by the findings of Ashton (1991) and Owhoso et al. (2002). Yet, as experience 
facilitates the acquisition of more specific knowledge (Libby & Tan 1994; Marchant 1990), 
the overall experience of an auditor may serve as a useful proxy for expertise. As this study 
is chiefly concerned with the overall experience of auditors, whether it impacts performance 
directly or indirectly is not of high importance. Taken as a whole, the evidence appears to 
lean slightly toward experience having more positive effects on audit work, and thereby audit 
quality, in the form of actual monitoring strength. Recent research on this subject is, 
however, scarce. Bédard and Chi (1993) noted that expertise in auditing is poorly 
understood. Given the dearth of behavioral research in recent years, it appears justified to 
state that the state of affairs hasn’t changed much since. In addition, the many changes and 
regulatory requirements that have been brought to bear on the profession in the last 20-30 
years may have had profound impacts on the specific mix of tasks that auditors of various 
levels of experience perform. The results obtained in these behavioral studies therefore have 
to be interpreted as merely suggestive. 
3.1.2 Auditor Tenure and Industry Specialization 
Studies on auditor tenure and industry specialization may provide further insight into how 
audit experience may come to facilitate higher quality. Analyses have been conducted on the 
level of the individual auditor as well as the audit firm. Due to the nature of this study, the 
impacts of the individual auditor’s tenure and specialization are focused on here. 
As illustrated by regulatory developments in the 21st century, auditor tenure has been 
connected to questions of independence and expertise, both of which are relevant for 
assessments of audit quality. In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX 2002) 
mandated audit signee rotation every five years. Four years after, an EU directive 
(2006/43/EC) imposed a similar requirement for member states of the union. The main goal 
of these regulations was to improve auditor independence, which was seen by some as being 
potentially compromised by excessively long audit partner tenures (GAO 2003; EU 
Directive 2006/43/EC). However, some academics have presented evidence that called into 
question the benefits of these regulations (e.g. Chen et al. 2008; Huang et al. 2015; Kwon et 
al. 2014; Manry et al. 2008). Others have noted that as audit firm tenure increases, the auditor 
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may be able to gain client-specific expertise that may facilitate higher audit quality, and that 
such rotation rules could lead to additional costs (e.g. Ghosh & Moon 2005; Gul et al. 2009; 
EY 2015; KPMG 2017).  
As this relates to experience, one would expect more experienced auditors to have, on 
average, longer tenures in their client portfolios, regardless of rotation requirements. This is 
simply due to the fact that experienced auditors have been involved in the business for a 
longer time and have therefore had more opportunities to establish longer-standing 
relationships with their clients. Studies investigating audit signee tenure have generally 
found tenure to be positively associated with measures of higher audit quality (e.g. Carcello 
& Nagy 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Manry et al. 2008), although some have presented mixed or 
contrary evidence (eg. Bedard & Johnstone 2010; Carey & Simnett 2006). Taken as a whole, 
the body of research on signee tenure seems to indicate that quality is likely to be higher as 
the tenure of the auditor increases. Hay (2013) further notes a positive association between 
tenure and fees in his meta-analysis of audit fee studies. 
Most studies regarding industry specialization have focused on the specialization of the audit 
firm, rather than the specialization of the individual auditor (Zerni 2012). Such studies have 
mostly found industry specialization to be positively associated with proxies of higher audit 
quality (e.g. Bills et al. 2015; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Gul et al. 2009; 
Knechel et al. 2007; O’Keefe et al. 1994b), although here too some mixed or contrary 
evidence has been presented (cf. Ferguson & Stokes 2002). As argued by Hay (2013), the 
weight of evidence regarding audit firm industry specialization therefore appears to be in 
favor of a positive association with audit fees. 
However, Ferguson et al. (2003) presented evidence from Australia that audit fees seem to 
reflect industry expertise on an office-level, rather than at the firm-level. They further argue 
that expertise is an individual auditor’s engagement-specific property. These sentiments 
have been echoed by several other scholars (e.g. Zerni 2012; Reichelt & Wang 2010: Choi 
et al. 2010), even if some of these studies have remained at the office-level rather than 
directly investigating the specialization of individual audit signees. 
If industry expertise is a personal characteristic rather than a characteristic of the firm, then 
it might be the case that these firm-level studies can be partially extrapolated to the individual 
level. Some corroborative evidence on specialization of individual auditors has since been 
brought forth. Zerni (2012) studied the connection between industry specialization and fees 
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on the level of an individual audit signee in Sweden and found, first, that specialization 
occurs on the individual level, and second, that specialization in large public companies as 
well as specific industries was associated with higher fees. Goodwin and Wu (2014) 
furthered this literature by comparing office-level and partner-level specialization, and found 
a significant positive association for specialization at the signee level and fees. Controlling 
for this, no association was found for the office-level, suggesting that expertise lies indeed 
with the individual. Chi et al. (2017) investigated the impacts of client-specific experience 
and experience accumulated before the engagement on audit quality and perceptions thereof. 
They found experience predating the client as well as client-specific experience to be 
associated with lower discretionary accruals and creditor perceptions of quality in an 
Australian setting. As Garcia-Blandon and Argiles-Bosch (2018) noted, the scarce body of 
evidence on specialization at the audit signee level seems to generally indicate higher 
quality. However, they themselves presented evidence to the contrary from the Spanish audit 
market, suggesting the need for further research on this issue. 
The behavioral research discussed in the previous chapter appears to lend some credence to 
this view of experience facilitating industry and client-specific knowledge, as an individual 
auditor’s experience was concluded as likely facilitating knowledge acquisition that 
translates to better performance in specific audit tasks. A behavioral study by Low (2004) 
studied how industry specialization affects the risk assessment and planning decisions of 
auditors. He found specialization to improve risk assessments and to have mostly positive 
effects on planning, providing some further support for higher quality on the level of a 
specialized individual. Another study conducted by Bedard and Wright (1994) found 
auditors with more domain-specific experience to perform better on a risk assessment and 
audit program design task. On the other hand, Solomon et al. (1999) observed that industry-
specialized auditors had better knowledge of non-errors in financial statements, but their 
evidence regarding knowledge of errors in the financial statements was mixed. As Bedard 
(2012) notes, behavioral research generally appears to support the notion of higher quality 
for industry specialists. 
In conclusion, it appears that auditor tenure and specialization are associated with higher 
audit quality. Given that more experienced audit partners have had more time to cultivate 
long relationships with clients and specialize in certain industries, it also seems likely that 
domain-specific expertise and tenure are highly correlated with overall experience. Such a 
conjecture is corroborated to some degree by the behavioral research concerning the effects 
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of auditor experience outlined in the previous chapter. As discussed therein, overall 
experience may facilitate higher task-specific performance through the acquisition of 
subspecialty knowledge (Libby and Tan 1994; Marchant 1990; Owhoso et al. 2002). Further 
behavioral studies concerning industry specialization (e.g. Bedard & Wright 1994; Low 
2004) presented here also mostly support this view (cf. Solomon et al. 1999). As such, 
overall experience may come to contribute to audit quality and audit fees through knowledge 
relating to either a specific client or its industry in general, both of which are also likely to 
be connected with auditor tenure. 
3.2 CONNECTING AUDIT EXPERIENCE TO AUDIT FEES 
As discussed earlier, for audit fees to be causally linked to audit experience, audit experience 
would likely have to be connected to either the auditor’s reputation or monitoring strength, 
which in turn would affect audit fees. In chapter 2.4, it was concluded that the auditor’s 
monitoring strength is likely to influence audit fees. In chapter 3.1, it was proposed that 
behavioral studies as well as studies on auditor tenure and auditor specialization lend some 
support to the view that audit experience is associated with higher quality.  
In sum, it appears quite possible, or even likely, that audit experience has a positive effect 
on audit quality, leading to higher fees. However, several significant caveats have to be 
made. The connections suggested by scholars between audit experience and audit expertise 
are largely under-researched, with some evidence providing mixed results (Bédard & Chi 
1993). Additional inquiries and empirical studies into these topics are therefore needed. 
Furthermore, literature on the effects of an auditor’s reputation on the individual audit signee 
level appears scarce or non-existent. As such, the connections between audit experience and 
audit quality are examined here only through factors relating to monitoring strength. Based 
on the discussion of the behavioral studies concerning audit experience and the literature on 
auditor industry and client specialization, Figure 3 seeks to illustrate the potential 
relationship between experience and an auditor’s monitoring strength, utilizing in part the 
distinctions between different types of knowledge made by Bonner and Lewis (1990, pp. 3-
6). 
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Figure 3 – Audit Experience, Expertise, and Monitoring Strength. 
 
As can be seen from the figure, experience may facilitate the acquisition of different types 
of knowledge relating to specific audit tasks, clients or industries. Industry-specific and 
client-specific expertise are then expected to translate to task-specific knowledge. As argued 
by Bonner and Lewis (1990), the relationship between experience and task-specific 
performance is therefore not a direct one. However, if experience facilitates the acquisition 
of these different types of knowledge, the auditor’s monitoring strength can be expected to 
increase through higher performance on audit tasks. 
As illustrated previously in Figure 2, monitoring strength in turn is likely to be a crucial 
component of audit fees. This relationship is somewhat obscure due to the various 
interpretations of the term audit quality. However, if conventional methods of measuring 
audit quality are accepted, then the connection between monitoring strength and audit fees 
appears quite clear. As discussed in chapter 2.4.1, prior research has found many associations 
between audit fees and quality measures that relate to monitoring strength. 
Because audit fees are determined on the markets, it can be posited that fees are most directly 
affected by perceptions of quality. However, actual monitoring strength is likely to be 
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factored into these perceptions as the two are expected to become closely connected over 
time, as suggested by Watkins et al. (2004). Additionally, perceptions of auditor 
independence and confidence are important determinants of audit quality in their own right 
(IESBA 2018, p. 29; SEC 2000). It is therefore tentatively suggested here that audit 
experience facilitates higher quality and thereby higher audit fees, irrespective of the degree 
to which this relationship is mediated by reputational factors or monitoring strength. Having 
established this understanding, the following chapter outlines the existing research literature 
on the determinants of audit fees and audit models. 
3.3 THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES AND AUDIT FEE MODELS 
In his seminal work, Simunic (1980) pioneered the development of audit fee modeling. His 
work served as the basis on which future models were to be constructed and later extended 
(Choi et al. 2010). As Causholli et al. (2010) note, audit fees would under Simunic’s (1980) 
model equal the total costs of an audit if a given audit firm produces equivalent perceived 
quality across engagements in competitive markets. Causholli et al. (2010) further point out 
that these classic audit fee models linked fees directly to client characteristics, thereby 
bypassing production factors. Consequently, the audit fee models that emerged from this 
approach view the characteristics of the auditee as ‘effective proxies for the factors of 
production and process cost’ (Ibid., p. 170). This approach is partly due to the difficulty in 
obtaining data on production factors, chiefly labor hours (Causholli et al. 2010; DeFond & 
Zhang 2014). This study also faces such a limitation of data availability, and therefore the 
rather simplistic approach of viewing client attributes as indirect measures of audit effort 
and process costs has to be adopted here. In the following, an overview of commonly used 
audit fee models and their inputs is provided. 
3.3.1 Commonly Used Audit Fee Models 
Various different quantitative models have been used to estimate audit fees. These typically 
take the form of OLS regression models, with inputs regarding the characteristics of the 
auditor, the auditee or the audit engagement itself. The models are designed to account for 
the multitude of factors that are known to have an association with audit fees. Hay (2013) 
contends that these models are simplifications of the pricing process, and that they may 
therefore represent the complex reality of pricing only poorly. As discussed previously, the 
pricing of audit services is a product of various factors that may be interrelated. Additionally, 
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many of these proposed constituents of audit fees are either poorly understood or without 
firm backing from the research literature. Hay (2013) further argues that some crucial 
variables may possibly have been omitted from these models, despite the fact that they 
generally tend to achieve high explanatory power. Based on the previous discussions 
regarding the complexity of audit fee determination, such criticisms appear reasonable. 
Thus, one has to be particularly careful in constructing OLS regression models of audit fees, 
as the underlying assumptions of OLS models may easily be violated.  
3.3.2 The Determinants of Audit Fees 
Prior research has included nearly 200 different independent variables that may have an 
impact on audit fees (Causholli et al. 2010; Hay et al. 2006). Hay et al. (2006, p. 147) classify 
these into (1) client attributes, (2) auditor attributes, and (3) engagement attributes. Some of 
these attributes may be relate to context-specific factors, and therefore not be directly 
applicable to every audit market. However, certain attributes have been consistently found 
to be associated with audit fees, and many of these are the same as those that are used in the 
models seeking to estimate other measures of audit quality (DeFond & Zhang 2014). 
These factors tend to relate to characteristics of the client, but some characteristics of the 
audit firm have also been noted to be significant. In addition, some research has also pointed 
to the personal characteristics of auditors as being associated with quality or fees (e.g. Cahan 
& Sun 2015; Gul et al. 2013; Niemi 2004; Sundgren & Svanström 2014). Based on prior 
research, the variables commonly used in audit fee models are summarized below in 
accordance with the categorization proposed by Hay et al. (2006). In addition, the audit 
experience of an individual auditor is also considered, as it is the focus of the empirical 
section of this study. 
Client Attributes 
As discussed above, client attributes have generally formed the core of most audit fee 
models. The attributes that have been found to be significant include the client’s size, risk, 
and complexity (Causholli et al. 2010; Hay 2013; Hay et al. 2006). The underlying logic of 
these measurements is that changes in such attributes are expected to affect the amount of 
effort, i.e. labor hours, the auditor has to expend in conducting the audit (Causholli et al. 
2010). In other words, as Causholli et al. (2010) and Hay et al. (2006) argue, these measures 
serve as proxies of production factors and process costs. 
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Client size has been identified as perhaps the most important attributed influencing audit 
fees (Hay 2013; Hay et al. 2006). Larger clients entail a larger volume of data presented in 
the financial statements, necessitating more testing by the auditor. The most common 
measure of client size has been total assets on the balance sheet, although some studies have 
also used revenue measurements (Hay 2013). The internal control environment is also likely 
to be more elaborate in larger companies, so the auditor also has to conduct more audit work 
to assess these controls. Although better internal control systems reduce control risk and may 
reduce the amount of testing necessary (Hogan & Wilkins 2008), the overwhelming body of 
evidence on client size as a driver of audit fees suggests that such an effect does not offset 
the impact of other size-related factors on fees. 
Variables relating to client risk commonly include various measures of working capital, 
leverage, profitability and financial ratios indicating investor returns (DeFond & Zhang 
2014; Hay 2013; Hay et al. 2006). These measures relate to the inherent risk in the client’s 
accounts and the risks of deliberate manipulation of the managements’ reports. For instance, 
higher working capital may indicate earnings manipulation, and low profitability may 
incentivize management to cover up poor performance by presenting overly positive reports. 
Measures of leverage may indicate financial distress, and they may also indicate the presence 
of financial covenants that could provide further incentives to manipulate the reports. High 
indicators of client risk may imply greater risk for the auditor to become involved in 
litigation that could losses (Hope & Langli 2010; Simunic 1980).  
Client complexity is usually measured by the number of the company’s subsidiaries or the 
number of business segments they have (Causholli et al. 2010; Hay et al. 2006). Simunic 
(1980) argued that greater decentralization of decision making increases the monitoring 
effort of the auditor. The same principle can be applied to both decentralization in terms of 
business segments as well as the number of separate legal entities involved in the auditee’s 
reporting. Furthermore, if the client has to consolidate subsidiaries’ accounts, this is likely 
to require audit testing specifically targeted at these consolidation entries. 
Auditor Attributes 
Auditor attributes have also been found to play a crucial part in the determination of audit 
fees. Hay et al. (2006, pp. 176-177) further divide these attributes into ‘auditor quality’, 
‘auditor tenure’ and ‘auditor location’. Auditor quality has generally been proxied by 
characteristics of the audit firm, specifically through the Big Four auditor versus non-Big 
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Four auditor dichotomy or measures of the auditor’s industry specialization (Hay et al. 
2006). A significant price premium for these firms has often been observed (e.g. Choi et al 
2008; Ferguson & Stokes 2002; Francis & Simon 1987), although Hay (2013) notes in his 
meta-analysis that these results may be partly confounded by methodological issues. Hay & 
Knechel (2017) investigated the existence of the Big Four premium through meta-regression 
analysis and found that a statistically significant premium remained even after controlling 
for publication bias, although said bias resulted in overstating the premium by around 20 
percent.  
As discussed in chapter 3.1.2, auditor tenure and industry specialization also appear to be 
associated with higher audit quality and audit fees. Audit firm industry specialization is most 
commonly measured through the audit firm’s market share, in a given industry, of the client 
firms’ total assets, audit fees, or the total number of clients (Causholli et al. 2010). 
Audousset-Coulier et al. (2016) however make the point that the choice of an industry 
specialization measurement may have significant impacts on the outputs of models 
estimating audit fees or earnings quality. They argue that fee-based measures are likely to 
find fee premia, which may reflect audit quality, the auditor’s reputation, or bargaining 
power. On the other hand, they find negative associations for fees with measures of a given 
industry’s share in an auditor’s client portfolio, likely due to discounts related to economies 
of scale. As such, fee-based measures of market appear to be the most valid for capturing 
the effects industry specialization may have on audit quality. 
Longer audit firm tenure has mostly been found to have a positive association with fees in 
recent studies (Hay 2013). Hay et al. (2006) also noted an association between auditor 
change and fees in earlier studies, even though tenure itself wasn’t found significant in those 
studies. The more recent meta-analysis by Hay (2013), however, also found an association 
for tenure. It is worth noting that this connection between tenure or auditor change and audit 
fees may be confounded by the pricing policies of auditors. Fee discounts in the beginning 
of an audit engagement have been widely observed (DeAngelo 1981b; Fung et al. 2012; 
Huang et al. 2015; Kwon et al. 2014; Simon & Francis 1988). As such, a measure of audit 
firm tenure or auditor change appears to be an important variable to include in audit fee 
models.  
Hay (2013) also summarized the body of research on the effects of the auditor’s location on 
audit fees. His summary suggests that audits taking place in more expensive areas of a given 
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country may result in higher fees. He therefore suggests incorporating this variable into audit 
fee models, as previous studies have often omitted this variable. 
Less research has focused on the quality of the individual auditor. However, recent studies 
by Cahan and Sun (2015), Gul et al. (2013), as well as Sundgren and Svanström (2014) have 
observed statistically significant associations between audit quality and certain measures of 
the individual audit signee’s characteristics, such as educational level, experience, age, and 
the size of the auditor’s client portfolio. An earlier study by Niemi (2004) also found the 
auditor’s higher experience, level of education, and certification level to be associated with 
increased audit fees. As discussed in chapter 3.1.2, the scarce studies on industry 
specialization and tenure of an individual auditor lend some support to a positive association 
with fees. Similarly, the behavioral studies (see chapter 3.1.1) examining the individual 
characteristics of an auditor also seem to be suggestive, on balance, of positive effects on 
audit quality. 
The logic behind the idea of an audit signee’s individual characteristics having impacts on 
audit quality and fees is quite intuitive: audit engagements are ultimately conducted by 
individual auditors whose characteristics are likely to play into the decisions and judgements 
made during the audit process. However, the availability of information regarding the 
auditors’ personal characteristics is scarce in many regulatory environments. 
Engagement Attributess 
Hay et al. (2006) also outline a group of variables that relate to the specific engagement, as 
opposed to the auditor or the client. These include attributes such as report lag, i.e. the time 
it takes to issue the audit report after year end, whether the audit opinion is modified, whether 
the audit is conducted during the busy season, and the amount of non-audit services (NAS) 
provided to the client. Hay (2013) notes that most recent studies have found positive 
associations for audit fees and modified or qualified audit opinions as well as audits that take 
place during the busy season, although the association for the latter appears to be weaker. 
He also reports that most studies have found strongly significant positive associations for 
non-audit services and audit fees.  
Aside from NAS, the relationships found with these other variables are logically 
straightforward. Modified audit opinions and report lag may imply a larger number of 
problems encountered during the audit, which necessitates more work form the auditor. Busy 
season audits, on the other hand, may require overtime work from auditors (Hay et al. 2006), 
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and the members of the audit team may also be less efficient due to longer working hours 
and added time pressure. For non-audit services, Causholli et al. (2010) propose that higher 
fees may indicate that they add value to the audit, although as Hay (2013) notes, many have 
suggested that non-audit services may result in fee-cutting due to the income the audit firms 
gain from these other services.  
3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES OF AUDIT FEES 
As discussed above, several disparate lines of research have, in one way or another, 
investigated whether and how experience may contribute to audit quality and fees. The 
behavioral studies outlined in chapter 3.1.1 suggest that experience may facilitate higher 
quality of audit work, though the results are somewhat equivocal and perhaps even out of 
date given the changes in the profession. Worth noting is that many of these studies noted a 
distinction between overall experience and more specific knowledge, though others 
emphasized the role of experience in facilitating knowledge acquisition. This study is more 
concerned with the role of overall experience, so whether its effects are mediated by other 
types of knowledge is not of paramount importance. Marchant (1990) argued that variables 
concerning specific types of audit knowledge could decrease the explanatory of overall 
experience, so omitting such variables in studies such as this may be in order. 
The relationships between auditor tenure and industry specialization with quality and fees 
appear clearer. However, most of these studies have focused on tenure and specialization on 
the audit-firm level. As such, only indirect and suggestive inferences can be made based on 
this literature as they relate to quality and fees.  
Based on the discussion in chapter 3.3, the most important variables relate to the attributes 
of the client. Additionally, certain auditor attributes are also known to be associated with 
fees. Engagement related factors have also been identified, though these are likely not as 
important in the relatively homogenous sample used in this study. Thus, auditor and client 
related variables will form the core of the models used in the empirical section. Notably, 
however, there is a general lack of studies utilizing information on the personal 
characteristics of individual audit signees. This study will therefore attempt to contribute to 
this literature by incorporating such measures into the models. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The empirical section of this study seeks to estimate the effects of auditor experience on 
audit quality and audit fees through OLS estimation. To address the research question RQ1 
a hypothesis is developed and various OLS models constructed to test it with a sample 
consisting of TE500 companies during 2012-2016. This chapter outlines the rationale for the 
hypothesis, the data used in the sample, and the construction of the regression models. 
4.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The literature review conducted in chapters 2 and 3 indicates that audit experience may affect 
fees through many different pathways, and that whether experience facilitates higher of 
lower quality and fees is not entirely clear. The behavioral studies appear to lean somewhat 
in favor of positive effects, though many of them have also produced contrary results (see 
chapter 3.1.1). Additionally, most of these studies date back the previous century before the 
big accounting scandals and consequent regulations transpired. The profession has changed 
markedly in the 2000’s, and the tasks individual auditors face may also be different in many 
ways when compared to those examined in the behavioral studies. However, the fundamental 
process of auditing is still similar, so these studies collectively may be taken to lend some 
support to the notion that experience facilitates higher quality and fees. Research concerned 
with auditor tenure and specialization also indicates that some degree of learning takes place 
during the course of the auditor’s work (see chapter 3.1.2). 
The author is aware of only three studies that have directly examined overall experience in 
relation to fees. Niemi (2004) included the overall experience of an auditor as a variable into 
his regression models on audit fees in small Finnish audit firms and found it to be positively 
associated with audit fees based on hourly billing rates. Though the context of his study was 
quite different, it supports at least to some degree the notion that experience is priced into 
the fees in the market. A more recent study conducted by Cahan and Sun (2015) took this 
relationship between experience and fees as one of their study’s main focuses and found a 
positive association. Though this study concerned Chinese firms, its results may still be 
indicative for other audit markets as well. On the other hand, Hardies et al. (2015) found a 
significant negative association for their control variable of overall experience in Belgian 
firms. However, as the audit markets are relatively small in Finland, it may be the case that 
an individual reputation is easier for auditors to establish.  
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Given and the evidence provided by Niemi (2004) as well as Cahan and Sun (2015) and the 
literature review conducted in chapters 2 and 3, it appears more likely than not that audit 
experience will have some form of positive association with fees, despite the conflicting 
results of Hardies et al. (2015). Thus, the same hypothesis as in Cahan and Sun’s (2015, p. 
84) study is tested to answer RQ1: 
H1: Audit fees are positively associated with signee’s audit experience. 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE 
The data used in this study consist of two main bodies: (1) data on the time of authorization 
of KHT auditors, and (2) financial statements information of TE500 companies through 
2012-2016, including data on the total audit fees charged for audit services in a given fiscal 
year for each audit engagement. The former set of data was collected by the accounting 
department of Aalto University, and then further augmented using data provided by PRH. 
The latter body of data was collected by the accounting department from BvD / Moody’s 
Analytics’ Amadeus database for balance sheet and profit and loss statement information, 
and the audit fee data was hand-collected from the registered financial statements of TE500 
companies, accessed through PRH’s database Virre. 
The authorization years of auditors were matched with the financial statements information 
mainly by the audit signees’ names and birth years. In the few cases where ambiguities 
remained, these were resolved, where possible, through recourse to various online sources 
regarding the auditors’ audit firm affiliations, work histories, etc. The two bodies of data 
were then connected such that the year-end date of the fiscal year to which the financial 
statements relate could be used to calculate the amount of years that had elapsed from the 
authorization year of the auditor. Thus, at the end of the process, each firm-year observation 
included the experience of the audit signee as measured in whole years elapsed between 
KHT authorization and the end of the fiscal year under audit. The vast majority of new KHT 
auditors are officially registered as such in either December or January, shortly after passing 
the examination in the previous fall. The authorization years of auditors were therefore 
rounded to the closest full year, as this was deemed to be a sufficiently accurate level of 
detail given the size and nature of the sample. The number of years of overall audit 
experience then served as the basis for the different mathematical definitions of the audit 
experience variable utilized in the regression models. 
40 
 
The initial data had 2491 firm-year observations concerning the fiscal years 2012-2016, 
including audits conducted by both Big Four auditors and other firms. However, some firm-
year observations had to be dropped from the samples due to missing pieces of necessary 
information in the data. Some observations did not include the name of the principal audit 
signee. For others, information regarding the time of the signee’s authorization was 
unavailable as PRH’s dataset only extended back until 1992, and the accounting 
department’s dataset also lacked some auditors from these earlier years. In addition, some 
auditors who only had the lower level of authorization (“HT” auditors) were dropped from 
the sample as the focus here is exclusively on KHT auditors. Some observations were also 
dropped due to lacunae in the financial statements data.  
The regression models are applied to two samples, one consisting of audits by all audit firms, 
and a Big Four subsample consisting solely of audits by Big Four auditors. This is done in 
order to gain an understanding of whether the potential relationship between audit 
experience and audit fees is different in the Big Four firms compared with other audit firms. 
The nature and effects of the experience of an individual audit signee could differ from other 
auditors for many reasons. These may include, for instance, different backgrounds and career 
paths between the auditors, different intra-organizational restrictions on the auditors’ work, 
differences in professional education arranged or provided by the signee’s audit firm as well 
as various other factors.  Thus, an examination of a separate Big Four subsample may 
provide additional insight into the intricacies of the relationships between experience and 
fees. 
Table 1 displays the sample sizes for both samples after the omissions stated above. Despite 
these omissions, the final sample sizes for both the full sample (n = 2389) and the subsample 
(n = 2201) can be regarded as relatively large compared with other studies with audit fees as 
a dependent variable. For instance, Hay (2013) found in his meta-analysis of regression-
based audit fee studies that in 67 journal articles published during 2004-2007 the mean 
number of observations was 1539. Additionally, this number was inflated by a handful of 
significantly larger samples, such that most studies had sample sizes well below this mean. 
Thus, the sample sizes obtained here compare favorably with these studies, facilitating the 
acquisition of significant results through the OLS models. 
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Table 1 – Sample Sizes. 
  Number of observations 
Initial data 2491 
  
Less:  
Missing audit signee's name -31 
Missing audit signee's authorization date -7 
Audited by a non-KHT Auditor -20 
Missing financial statements data -40 
Missing audit fee data -4 
Final sample, all auditors 2389 
  
Less:  
Engagements of Non-Big Four auditors 188 
Final sample, Big Four auditors 2201 
 
4.3. THE AUDIT FEE MODELS 
Three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are estimated using the statistical 
software package STATA to test hypothesis H1. All three models are applied separately to 
both samples.  The initial model is based in part on the model of Cahan and Sun (2015), who 
investigated the association of audit experience and audit fees as well as discretionary 
accruals in the Chinese audit market. However, many adjustments are made to provide a 
slightly simpler model and to improve its fit to the context of the Finnish audit market.  
All three models seek to estimate the association between an independent variable (an audit 
signee’s overall audit experience) and the dependent variable (audit fees). Audit fees are 
defined in all models as the natural logarithm of the audit fees charged relating to the audit 
of a given fiscal year. In model 1, the audit signee’s experience is expressed as the natural 
logarithm of years of overall audit experience. Various control variables are incorporated 
into the model to separate the impact of known confounding factors associated with audit 
fees, as outlined in chapter 3.3.1. Industry dummies and year dummies are also included to 
control for fixed effects. The hypothesis H1 is first tested by estimating model 1: 
AFEE = b0 + b1LNSAEXP + b2BIG4 + b3AFIS + b4SMALE + b5ACHANGE + b6SIZE + 
b7LISTED +b8SQRSUB + b9LOSS + b10REC + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε, 
where: 
AFEE = the natural logarithm of total audit fees in euros charged by the auditor for audit 
services relating to the audit of a given fiscal year 
(1) 
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LNSAEXP = the audit report signee’s overall audit experience as the natural logarithm of the 
signee’s audit experience measured in years since KHT authorization 
BIG4 = dummy variable, coded 1 for engagements audited by Big Four auditors and 0 for 
engagements audited by a non-Big Four auditor 
AFIS = the audit firm’s industry specialization as the ratio of the audit firm’s total fees in the 
industry for a given fiscal year (based on two-digit SIC-codes) divided by the total audit fees 
of all audit firms in the same industry and fiscal year 
SMALE = dummy variable, assigned a value of 1 for male audit signees and 0 for females.  
ACHANGE = dummy variable, a value of 1 assigned if the audit signee or audit firm is 
different from the previous year, otherwise 0 
SIZE = the audit client’s size, measured as the natural logarithm of the auditee’s total assets 
LISTED = dummy variable with a value of 1 if the auditee is listed on the Nasdaq Helsinki 
Stock exchange, otherwise 0  
SQRSUB = the square root of the number of the client’s consolidated subsidiaries 
LOSS = dummy variable with a value of 1 if the financial statements indicate a negative net 
result, otherwise 0 
REC = the amount of total receivables on the client’s balance sheet, deflated by total assets 
 
Signee audit experience is defined here as the natural logarithm of the number of years of 
overall experience. The primary reason behind this conversion is that audit fees are not 
expected to grow in a linear fashion with experience throughout the entirety of an auditor’s 
career. One might expect an auditor to rapidly accumulate valuable experience in the early 
parts of their careers, whereas some diminishing returns are likely to occur in the later years 
as it gets increasingly difficult to gain new insights and improve work performance. The 
auditors’ years of overall experience since authorization are therefore converted into their 
natural logarithms to capture this pattern of decreasing growth. 
In contrast with Cahan and Sun (2015), the audit signee’s industry specialization is omitted 
from the models. As discussed in chapter 3.1.2, a greater weight of evidence lends support 
to an association between firm-level specialization and fees. In addition, if industry 
specialization ultimately resides in individual auditors, as proposed by Ferguson et al. (2003) 
and others, such measures would likely be highly correlated with each other. Indeed, such a 
high correlation was observed by Cahan and Sun (2015) between their measures of firm-
level and signee-level specialization. Moreover, a signee-level measure could weaken the 
explanatory power of overall experience (Marchant 1990), which is the topic of interest in 
this study. Consequently, that variable is not included in the models. This also prevents 
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problems of multicollinearity arising from incorporating two variables that are highly 
correlated with each other into the model. This would violate a central assumption of OLS 
regression models that the predictor variables are independent of one another, which might 
result in less reliable estimates for the regression coefficients (Wisniewski 2009, p. 385).  
In addition, signee education level is omitted due to the differences in the regulatory 
environments between China and Finland. In Finland, the auditor authorization system can 
be said to consist of two tiers, with the higher tier auditors consisting of KHT auditors (Niemi 
2004). The design of this study is concerned only with these higher tier auditors, who 
generally have at least a master’s level academic degree due to the requirements in place for 
authorization. Though the Finnish Auditing Act (1141/2015) permits HT and KHT 
authorization for auditors with bachelor level academic degrees, more stringent experience 
requirements apply for auditors without a master’s level degree (Finnish Auditing Act 
1141/2015 chapter 6, sections 2 & section 3 subsections 2 and 3). Thus, KHT auditors 
generally possess at least a master’s level academic degree. The gender variable of the signee 
is, however, retained in this study. Ittonen and Peni (2012) found a positive association for 
female signees and fees in three Nordic countries, including Finland, in a sample of audits 
from 2005 to 2006. Hardies et al. (2015) observed a roughly 7% premium among a large 
sample of Belgian audit clients during 2008-2011. These studies suggest that auditor gender 
may be salient also for this sample, given the similar cultural contexts. However, evidence 
for such a premium is still generally scarce.  
Direct measures of signee audit tenure and audit firm tenure are also omitted from the model. 
An alternative measure is put in their place due to reasons of data availability, as well as the 
fact that Cahan and Sun (2015) found these two measures not to have statistically significant 
associations with fees in their model. The substitute measure (ACHANGE) is a dummy 
variable that captures whether the audit signee is different compared to the previous fiscal 
year. A value of 1 is assigned for instances where a change in the audit signee has been 
observed, and a value of 0 is assigned where no change had taken place. In cases where the 
audit firm had changed, the audit partner also changed by necessity. Thus, the measure 
includes both firm and signee-level changes. The purpose of this measure is also to control 
for the impact of low-ball offers for audit engagements, a commonly observed phenomenon 
in the initial years of audit engagements (see chapter 3.3.2). 
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Other omitted control variables include the client’s number of business segments, as client 
complexity is expected to be better captured by the number of consolidated subsidiaries 
(SQRSUB). The model is further simplified by using the LOSS dummy as the primary 
measure of client risk in place of return on assets (ROA) and measures of the client’s 
indebtedness. This dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if the net result presented in the 
profit and loss statement is negative, and a value of 0 is assigned if the client turned a profit 
that fiscal year.  
Year dummies and industry dummies are incorporated into the model to control for fixed 
effects, and a dummy variable for modified audit opinions is omitted. The year and industry 
dummies control for fixed effects, as the sample consists of observations from five years and 
many different industries. The industry dummies are defined here based on two-digit SIC 
(standard industry classification) codes. Without controlling for year effects, the results 
might otherwise be distorted due to differences in many factors, such as differences in the 
macro-economic cycle as well as the evolving regulation of the auditing profession imposing 
increasing requirements on audit work. Likewise, different industries have disparate risks 
profiles, which may in turn affect audit fees. Finally, no dummy variable is included for 
modified audit opinions, as such instances are rare in the audit market of large Finnish 
companies, and thereby unlikely to significant affect the results. 
To further evaluate the relationship between experience and fees, a second model is 
constructed with a different specification of the experience variable. LNSAEXP is dropped 
in favor of an experience variable that is defined as the square of years elapsed since the 
auditor’s authorization (SAEXPSQ), which is included in the model along with the 
unmodified years of experience (SAEXP). This is done to test whether another definition of 
audit experience might better represent the relationship between experience and fees. An 
auditor’s experience could potentially be negatively associated with the quality of their work 
towards the end of their career due to, for instance, shortened career horizons (Knechel et al. 
2013), and reduced professional skepticism (Shaub & Lawrence 2002, cited in Nelson 2009). 
Thus, a relationship where an increase in experience is initially associated positively with 
fees, followed by a peak level and a negative association thereafter, is also conceivable. 
Squaring the years of experience may therefore better represent this relationship than the 
natural logarithm, if the relationship takes the shape of a downward opening parabola as 
described above. The following model is estimated to test this relationship: 
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AFEE = b0 + b1SAEXP + b2SAEXPSQ + b3BIG4 + b4AFIS + b5SMALE + b6ACHANGE + 
b7SIZE + b8LISTED +b9SQRSUB + b10LOSS + b11REC + Year dummies + Industry 
dummies + ε,  
where: 
SAEXP = the audit report signee’s overall audit experience as the number of years of 
experience since KHT authorization 
SAEXPSQ = the audit report signee’s overall experience as measured in years squared.  
The rest of the variables are the same as in model 1 (see definitions under equation 1). 
 
Finally, a third model is constructed to analyze how experience relates to audit fees at 
different levels of experience. The purpose of this model is to analyze whether an auditor’s 
experience may be differentially associated with fees at different stages of their careers, 
while permitting a relationship different from the ones proposed by the other two models to 
arise from the data. For instance, experience could have a strongly positive linear 
relationship with fees until the final few years of the auditor’s career followed by a 
significant drop as the auditors seek to slow down and prepare for retirement, in line with 
the arguments of Knechel et al. (2013). A categorical experience variable might therefore be 
better able to capture the relationship between experience and fees in such scenarios. 
In this model, an audit signees’s overall experience (SAEXPCAT) is defined on the basis of 
experience groupings that are expected to reflect different stages in the auditors’ careers. 
Auditors are divided into four experience categories based on a preliminary analysis of the 
auditors’ career spans conducted in chapter 5.1. The categories are dummy coded such that 
a reference category can be compared against others. 
Thus, the third model is estimated as follows: 
AFEE = b0 + b1SAEXPCAT + b2BIG4 + b3AFIS + b4SMALE + b5ACHANGE + b6SIZE + 
b7LISTED +b8SQRSUB + b9LOSS + b10REC + Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε, 
Where: SAEXPCAT = dummy variables for the four experience categories (0-5; 6-15; 16-
25; 26-40 years). A value of 1 is assigned where the auditor belongs to the given experience 
category, and a value of 0 is assigned otherwise. The rest of the variables are defined the 
same as in models 1 and 2. 
 
Finally, the models laid out above are all applied to the Big Four subsample, with one 
exception. The models are otherwise the same as equations 1, 2, and 3, except that the Big 
(2) 
(3) 
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Four dummy variable (BIG4) is now omitted from the model as redundant. This is done in 
order to examine whether the relationship between experience and fees is different in for Big 
Four auditors compared with the full sample. 
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5. FINDIGS & DISCUSSION 
This chapter begins with a description of the samples used in this study, followed by 
preliminary analyses of the ages, career spans, and experience of auditors, and how these 
may be related to audit fees. These analyses seek to establish a basis for the categorization 
of experience utilized in the third regression model and to provide insight as to whether a 
simple linear relationship exists between experience and fees in the absence of controls. 
Afterwards, the results of the regression models are reported for both samples, followed by 
an analysis of both as well as comparisons between the two. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the findings. 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the full sample and the Big Four subsample are reported in 
Table 2 below. As is evident from the table, the distributions for most variables are largely 
similar between the two samples due in part to the high proportion (92.1%) of audits 
conducted by the Big Four firms in the full sample. Such a high proportion, however, is to 
be expected in a sample consisting of the largest firms in Finland. The Big Four firms 
together hold dominant market shares in the audit market of large companies in Finland 
(PRH 2016) as well as elsewhere (EC 2017, p. 7; GAO 2008, p. 15). 
As illustrated in the table below, average fees were higher in the Big Four subsample. The 
mean natural logarithm of AFEE was 11.263 in the Big Four sample, compared with 11.118 
in the full sample, corresponding to 77,886€ and 72,258€, respectively. In the full sample, 
the auditors had a mean of 18.54 years of experience since authorization, compared with 
18.41 in the Big Four sample. The median was the same for both samples at 19 years. Thus, 
the largest Finnish companies tend to be audited by very experienced auditors. The 
maximum years of audit experience in the full sample was 38 years, compared with 33 years 
in the Big Four sample. This may suggest mandatory retirement age policies in the Big Four 
audit firms that prevent their auditors from acting as signing partners into their mid and late 
sixties. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (n = 2389). 
Variable   Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
 LNFEE 11.188 1.260 6.908 10.356 11.002 11.835 17.315 
 SAEXP 18.542 6.649 0.000 13.000 19.000 23.000 38.000 
 LNSAEXP 2.839 0.439 0.000 2.565 2.944 3.135 3.638 
 SAEXPSQ 388.005 253.490 0.000 169.000 361.000 529.000 1444.000 
 BIG4 0.921 0.269 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 AFIS 0.323 0.257 0.000 0.127 0.263 0.491 1.000 
 SMALE 0.794 0.404 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 ACHANGE 0.147 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 SIZE 18.809 1.425 14.998 17.754 18.602 19.623 24.528 
 LISTED 0.198 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 SQRSUB 2.273 2.781 0.000 0.000 1.732 3.464 21.679 
 LOSS 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 REC 0.171 0.147 -0.019 0.059 0.141 0.245 0.922 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for the Big Four Subsample (n = 2201) 
Variable   Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
 LNFEE 11.263 1.259 6.908 10.434 11.082 11.918 17.315 
 SAEXP 18.411 6.201 0.000 13.000 19.000 23.000 33.000 
 LNSAEXP 2.843 0.407 0.000 2.565 2.944 3.135 3.497 
 SAEXPSQ 377.408 231.550 0.000 169.000 361.000 529.000 1089.000 
 AFIS 0.345 0.251 0.007 0.150 0.280 0.508 1.000 
 SMALE 0.783 0.412 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 ACHANGE 0.146 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 SIZE 18.844 1.438 14.998 17.778 18.611 19.649 24.528 
 LISTED 0.211 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 SQRSUB 2.295 2.853 0.000 0.000 1.732 3.606 21.679 
 LOSS 0.230 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 REC 0.173 0.142 -0.019 0.065 0.147 0.246 0.922 
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Worth noting is also that the dummy variable SMALE obtains a coefficient of .794 in the full 
sample and .783 in the Big Four subsample, indicating that nearly 80% of the audits were 
signed by male auditors. This likely reflects in part the fact that in the late 1980’s and 1990’s 
males were significantly overrepresented in the number of newly authorized KHT auditors. 
Given the amount of experience possessed by these auditors of large companies, a majority 
were in fact authorized prior to the year 2000. However, since then the gender distribution 
has become much more balanced, nearing a ratio of 1 female to 1 male auditor, as indicated 
by the authorization data. Thus, later studies of audit quality and fees in large Finnish 
companies may deal with samples comprising more female auditors, which could affect the 
results of these studies to the extent that gender influences quality and/or fees.  
 Other notable differences were also observed. The Big Four sample had a higher mean of 
audit firm industry specialization (0.345) than the auditors in the full sample (0.323), and 
their audits comprised a higher number of audits of listed companies (21.1%) than in the full 
sample (19.8%). The square root of subsidiaries (SQRSUB) for clients in these two samples 
were 2.273 and 2.295 in the full sample and in the Big Four subsample, respectively. The 
figures suggest that the Big Four may have a greater capacity to specialize in certain 
industries, perhaps especially more complex ones, and be better equipped to audit larger and 
more complex entities than their non-Big Four counterparts.  
5.1.2 Audit Experience, Career Spans, and Fees 
In order to decide upon the groupings of the experience variable used in the third regression 
model (see equation 3), a preliminary analysis of KHT auditors’ typical career spans is 
conducted. The full sample consisted of 2389 firm-year observations and 236 unique 
auditors. Thus, the mean number of audit engagements for individual audit signees was just 
over 10 engagements per auditor. For 230 of these auditors, data on the auditors’ birth years 
were available, allowing for an examination of the ages of the auditors at authorization as 
well as at the time of the audit for the vast majority (2369) of observations in full sample.  
The average age of all auditors at the time of their authorization was 32.66 years. The median 
was 31 years and the standard deviation 4.31 years. For the Big Four subsample the average, 
median, and standard deviation were 32.19 years, 31 years, and 3.92 years, respectively. The 
ages of the auditors at the time of their authorization were therefore similar in both samples, 
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although variation appears slightly greater among non-Big Four auditors. Figure 4 depicts 
the age distribution of the auditors at the time of their KHT authorization for the full sample. 
Figure 4 – The Age of Auditors at the Time of Authorization. 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, the distribution of the ages of auditors at the time of 
their KHT authorization is heavily concentrated around the age of 31, although some 
auditors were authorized as late as in their late 40’s to early 50’s. The peak observed in the 
early 30’s is not surprising, as the requirements for KHT authorization include a requirement 
of at least three years of relevant accounting related work experience (Finnish Auditing Act 
1141/2015 chapter 6, section 2, subsection 5 & section 3, subsections 1 & 2). Thus, the 
typical KHT has likely obtained their master’s degree in their mid to late 20’s, and after 
fulfilling the experience requirements, completed the KHT authorization exam within 3-10 
years of graduation.  
Figure 5 (below) depicts the distribution of the KHT auditors’ ages at the end of the fiscal 
years that were audited in the full sample. The audit report signees of TE500 companies are 
mostly older than 38 years of age. In line with expectations, KHT auditors generally do not 
act as signing partners in large audit engagements in the early years after their authorization. 
Instead, the signees tend to be those at the highest levels of the audit firms’ organizations, 
i.e., partners. For the auditors to rise up the ranks of their organizations to a point where they 
begin to act as signing partners for large audit engagements, they therefore typically have to 
accumulate significant amounts of experience and stature within their firm and in the market, 
even after acquiring their KHT certificate. 
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Figure 5 – The Age of Auditors at the Time of the Audit. 
 
At the other tail of the distribution, there is a sharp drop-off in the number of audits 
conducted by auditors older than 61 years. This suggests that these auditors tend to retire 
relatively early. This may potentially reflect mandatory retirement ages in the audit firms, 
set at around or slightly above 60 years of age, especially among the Big Four auditors. Thus, 
the prime years for KHTs auditor in terms of the volume of audit reports signed are around 
39-61 years of age. 
At the 5th percentile of years of experience, auditors had 9 years of experience and 13 years 
at the 25th percentile. Thus, it appears that there is generally a lag of roughly 10 years after 
authorization before KHT auditors begin to act as signing partners in these TE500 audit 
engagements. At the 95th percentile, auditors had 29 years of experience, meaning that 90% 
of the firm-year observations consisted of audits signed by auditors with 9-29 years of 
experience after KHT authorization. A typical auditor signing the audit report of a TE500 
company therefore appears to obtain their authorization at around the age of 31, advance in 
their careers to a point where they act as signing partners on large engagements at around 
40, and finally, retire at roughly 61 years of age after a 30-year career as an authorized KHT 
auditor.  
Given this typical career span of KHT auditors, the auditors are likely to be close to 
retirement at around 25-26 years of experience. By then, they are likely well established 
financially and have shorter career horizons. A short career horizon near retirement age may 
lead to weaker incentives, in the form of profit shares, for such auditors, though this also 
depends on the structure of the compensation schemes in the audit firms (Knechel et al. 
2013). Consequently, the auditors may be less motivated to push for higher fees at the tail 
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end of their careers. Conversely, a KHT auditor can be regarded as relatively inexperienced 
until obtaining at least around 10 years of experience, since less experienced auditors rarely 
sign the audit reports of these large companies. Somewhere between 13 years (at the 25th 
percentile in terms of the number of audit reports signed) and 15 years of experience the 
auditor is, however, likely to be fairly well established in the market as well as within their 
own firm. Thus, if the relationship between experience and fees is not one of monotonic 
growth, the ‘prime’ years of a KHT auditor may be expected to be around 16 to 25 years 
since authorization, with potentially lower fees before and after this period in their careers.  
5.1.3 Audit Experience and Fees 
Figure 6 (below) illustrates the number of audit engagements and total audit fees charged by 
auditors at different levels of experience. The auditors with 11-15 years of experience 
audited the highest number of engagements (645 audits), though the fees they charged for 
these audits were significantly lower than for the group with 21-25 years of experience (141 
vs. 167 million euros), despite the latter group signing only 569 audits. Similarly, the group 
with 16-20 years of experience also had smaller fees relative to the number of audits they 
conducted. The proportion of fees charged by auditors with 26-30 years of experience was 
also higher than would be predicted by the number of audits conducted by this group. In 
contrast, the groups with up to 15 years as well as groups with more than 30 years of 
experience generally had lower fees relative to the number of audits. Thus, audit fees appear 
to peak during the latter half of the auditor’s career, excluding the final few years, and they 
also appear to be lower during the first 15 years. 
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Figure 6 – Audit Fees and Number of Firm-year Observations by Level of Experience. 
 
 
Taken together, this pattern suggests a positive relationship between experience and fees, 
though not a linear one. A causal relationship between experience and fees cannot be inferred 
from this pattern. The larger fees among auditors with more experience relative to the less 
experienced auditors may very well reflect differences in the characteristics of these 
auditors’ clients, such as size and complexity, as well as engagement-specific attributes, or 
even other personal characteristics of the individual auditors. 
A look at the correlations between the experience variables and audit fees (AFEE) as well as 
amongst the independent variables may provide further insight into these relationships. The 
purpose of correlation measures is to observe whether two variables have a linear 
relationship with each other, i.e., whether a change in one variable results in a corresponding 
change in the other (Waters 1997, pp. 249-250). The correlation coefficient shows the 
strength of this linear relationship as a value between -1 and 1. A correlation matrix is 
therefore constructed to analyze these relationships. 
Table 3 depicts the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables used in 
the regression models. Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation, which is derived from 
Pearson’s coefficient, applies to ranked data, and is interpreted the same way as Pearson’s 
coefficient (Waters 1997, pp. 252-254). Spearman’s coefficient can therefore be used to 
assess relationships where variables are not linearly related or normally distributed and may 
thus be more appropriate for some variables. The Pearson coefficients are located on the left 
side of the diagonal with the Spearman coefficients on the right. 
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Table 3 – Pearson and Spearman correlations. 
Variable AFEE LNSAEXP SAEXP SAEXPSQ EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4 BIG4 AFIS SMALE ACHANGE SIZE LISTED SQRSUB LOSS REC 
AFEE 1 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.12* 0.07* -0.03 0.00 0.22* 0.30* 0.00 0.01 0.61* 0.50* 0.61* 0.10* 0.05* 
LNSAEXP 0.06* 1 1.00* 1.00* -0.27* -0.76* 0.32* 0.65* -0.05* 0.00 0.14* -0.12* 0.10* -0.07* 0.05* -0.07* -0.09* 
SAEXP 0.02 0.95* 1 1.00* -0.27* -0.76* 0.32* 0.65* -0.05* 0.00 0.14* -0.12* 0.10* -0.07* 0.05* -0.07* -0.09* 
SAEXPSQ -0.01 0.87* 0.98* 1 -0.27* -0.76* 0.32* 0.65* -0.05* 0.00 0.14* -0.12* 0.10* -0.07* 0.05* -0.07* -0.09* 
EC1 -0.12* -0.57* -0.35* -0.23* 1 -0.12* -0.15* -0.07* -0.16* -0.04* -0.01 0.05* -0.08* -0.08* -0.03 0.07* -0.02 
EC2 0.06* -0.61* -0.71* -0.68* -0.12* 1 -0.67* -0.33* 0.06* 0.00 -0.01 0.10* -0.05* 0.11* 0.02 0.02 0.10* 
EC3 -0.02 0.37* 0.28* 0.15* -0.15* -0.67* 1 -0.42* 0.10* 0.04 -0.12* -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* -0.05* -0.03 -0.05* 
EC4 -0.01 0.52* 0.67* 0.75* -0.07* -0.33* -0.42* 1 -0.14* -0.04 0.18* -0.08* 0.06* -0.04* 0.06* -0.02 -0.05* 
BIG4 0.21* 0.03 -0.06* -0.13* -0.16* 0.06* 0.10* -0.14* 1 0.39* -0.09* -0.01 0.06* 0.11* -0.02 0.08* 0.09* 
AFIS 0.30* 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.29* 1 -0.02 0.01 0.15* 0.22* 0.18* 0.04 0.03 
SMALE -0.01 0.10* 0.14* 0.16* -0.01 -0.01 -0.12* 0.18* -0.09* -0.02 1 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.10* 0.01 0.01 
ACHANGE 0.01 -0.12* -0.12* -0.11* 0.05* 0.10* -0.05* -0.08* -0.01 0.00 -0.04 1 0.05* 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.04* 
SIZE 0.70* 0.11* 0.10* 0.09* -0.09* -0.03 0.02 0.05* 0.08* 0.20* 0.01 0.04 1 0.28* 0.43* -0.05* -0.37* 
LISTED 0.55* -0.02 -0.05* -0.07* -0.08* 0.11* -0.05* -0.04* 0.11* 0.22* -0.01 0.01 0.36* 1 0.56* 0.00 0.14* 
SQRSUB 0.70* 0.07* 0.06* 0.06* -0.05* 0.01 -0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.22* 0.08* 0.02 0.57* 0.56* 1 0.01 0.03 
LOSS 0.070* -0.09* -0.08* -0.07* 0.07* 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.08* 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.05* 0.00 -0.01 1 0.00 
REC -0.05* -0.05* -0.07* -0.08* -0.02 0.09* -0.04* -0.04* 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.04* -0.35* 0.07* -0.05* 0.00 1 
* Denotes significance at p<0.05  
Note. EC1 = Experience category 0-5 years, EC2 = 6-15 years, EC3 = 16-25 years, and EC4 = 26-40 years
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As can be noted from the table, the dependent variable AFEE had moderate to strong 
correlations with several independent variables. These were mostly in line with expectations 
and prior literature. A strong correlation was observed for AFEE with SIZE (Pearson 
coefficient of 0.70), at p<0.05. Interestingly, SQRSUB had an equally strong correlation 
(Pearson: 0.70), also significant at p<0.05. Thus, size and complexity appear to have a strong 
relationship with fees, as suggested by the meta-analysis of Hay (2013). A significant 
(p<0.05) and moderate correlation was also noted between the variables LISTED and AFEE 
(Pearson: 0.55; Spearman: 0.50), indicating that audit fees tend to be higher for listed 
companies. A lower, though still significant correlation (0.30 for both Spearman’s and 
Pearson’s coefficients) was found for AFIS, suggesting that market leaders in an industry 
tend to fetch higher fees as discussed in chapters 3.1.2 and 3.3.2. The significant correlations 
for BIG4 with AFEE (Pearson: 0.21; Spearman 0.22) also indicate that the Big Four may 
charge higher fees, in line with prior literature. 
However, no strong correlations were found between AFEE and any of the audit experience 
variables.  Though the Pearson’s coefficient for LNSAEXP is significant at p<0.05, a 
correlation of 0.06 indicates only a very weak positive relationship. As such, it appears that 
no strong relationship exists between these two variables in the absence of controls. The 
non-significant Spearman’s coefficient of 0.00 supports this view. SAEXPSQ, used in model 
2, is not significantly correlated with AFEE by either Pearson’s or Spearman’s coefficient. 
Interestingly, significant correlations (p<0.05) were noted for the experience category 
dummies EC1 (Pearson: -0.12; Spearman: -0.12) and EC2 (Pearson: 0.06; Spearman: 0.07). 
This indicates that fees are relatively low for the group with 0-5 years of experience (EC1), 
and higher for the group with 6-15 years (EC2) compared with all other groups – a pattern 
not evident from Figure 6, in which the latter group also appears to obtain relatively low 
fees. This may suggest that experience beyond 15 years since authorization is not associated 
with higher fees, as the correlations for EC3 and EC4 with AFEE were not significant. 
Despite this pattern, SIZE and SQRSUB seem to grow with increasing years of experience, 
as indicated by the correlations of these variables with EC1 and EC4. The Pearson 
correlation of -0.05 for EC1 and SQRSUBS was significant, as was the coefficient of 0.05 
for EC4. For SIZE, significant Pearson correlations of -0.09 and 0.05 were noted with EC1 
and EC4, respectively. Thus, more experienced auditors tend to audit larger and more 
complex clients. 
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As for the relationships among the independent variables, most variables had pairwise 
correlation coefficients of <|0.4|, and of these most were less than |0.2|. However, the 
significant (p<0.05) correlations between SIZE and SQRSUB (Pearson: 0.57; Spearman 
0.43) as well as SQRSUB and LISTED (Pearson: 0.56; Spearman: 0.56) were moderate. 
Additionally, the experience variables SAEXP and SAEXPSQ had a Pearson correlation of 
0.98 (significant at p<0.05) indicating a very strong linear relationship between these two 
variables. Though the rest of the variables had mostly weak correlations, the correlations 
noted above may indicate multicollinearity issues. A further examination of the VIFs 
(variance inflation factors) of the variables was therefore conducted to see whether these 
may present an issue for the regressions. The mean VIF for all the variables in the full sample 
was 1.44 and 1.43 in the Big Four sample. Most variables had VIF values lower than 1.5, 
and no VIFs above 3.07 were observed, except for SAEXP and SAEXPSQ, which had VIFs 
of 27.44 and 27.79, respectively. These figures for SAEXP and SAEXPSQ are very high, and 
their regression coefficients will therefore be far less reliable and less likely to be significant 
in model 2 due to higher standard errors. Beyond these two variables, however, it can be 
concluded that the regression estimates should not be impaired by multicollinearity. 
In sum, the preliminary analyses indicate that audit fees do not grow monotonically with 
experience. However, some patterns still emerged from the data. Effectively controlling for 
the many different factors that are known to be associated with audit fees is therefore 
essential in order to obtain accurate and insightful results. Given the patterns discussed 
above, SAEXPCAT, used in the third model (see equation 3), is divided in to four groups: (1) 
0-5 years, (2) 6-15 years, (3) 16-25 years, and (4) 26-40 years to capture the effects of the 
different stages in an auditor’s career. The first category seeks address the question of 
whether auditors obtain lower fees during the very early years of their career since KHT 
authorization. The second group addresses the stage at which auditors are expected to 
aggressively establish themselves in the market. The correlation between the dummy for this 
group and AFEE in Table 3 also indicates that fees may already be highest at this point. The 
third group is expected to consist of the prime years for most auditors in that they are already 
well established in the market but not yet seeking to slow down in preparation for retirement. 
The final grouping consists of auditors in the twilight of their careers, which could be 
associated with higher fees as the auditors possesses the most experience by then, or 
alternatively, lower fees if a slowing down effect occurs near retirement. 
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5.2 REGRESSION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 Regression Results and the Principles of their Interpretation 
The regression results were obtained through OLS regression using the statistics software 
STATA. The program computed the regression coefficients by minimizing the sum of the 
squared residuals. Tables 4 and 5 report the results for the three regression models for the 
full sample and the Big Four subsample, respectively.  
The regression output displays the regression coefficients for the intercept and all the 
independent variables, as well as their t-statistics, standard errors and p-values. The 
regression coefficients measure the slope of the regression line obtained through the OLS 
method, indicating how much and in what direction the dependent variable changes in line 
with the independent variable in question (Wisniewski 2009, pp. 362-363). The t-values in 
the tables display the coefficient’s distance from the hypothesized population value as the 
ratio of the observed difference divided by the parameter’s standard error (Ibid. 2009, p. 
363). If the significance level for a test is set at α=0.05, and the probability of acquiring a 
given t-value under the null hypothesis is equal to or less than 5%, that is, p≤0.05, the results 
are generally said to be statistically significant, though other thresholds are also used. 
The Adjusted R2 value displayed at the bottom of the tables is the coefficient of 
determination, which indicates the goodness of fit of the model, and it obtains a value 
between 0 and 1 (Wisniewski 2009, p. 378). This value indicates the proportion of variation 
in the observed values of the dependent variable AFEE that is explained by the independent 
variables of the model. Thus, the closer the value is to one, the larger the proportion of 
variation explained by the model. Generally, a value of around 0.5 or higher can be 
considered a good fit, as the regression then explains at least half of the observed variation 
(Waters 1997, p. 249), though as Hay (2013) observed in his meta-analysis of audit fee 
research, the models used in this literature tend to obtain values as high as 0.7 or more. An 
F-test is also conducted in Stata to assess the overall significance of the equations. 
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Table 4 – Regression Results for the Full Sample. 
                              
  Model 1   Model 2   Model  3 
Variable Coefficient t-value Std error p-value  Coefficient t-value Std error p-value   Coefficient t-value Std error p-value 
Intercept 1.927 7.10 0.271 0.000  1.829 6.78 0.270 0.000  1.960 7.35 0.267   0.000  
LNSAEXP -0.049 -1.62 0.031 0.105           
SAEXP      0.004 0.45 0.010 0.651      
SAEXPSQ      -0.000 -1.00 0.000 0.315      
EC1           -0.292 -3.38 0.086 0.001 
EC2           0.000 (-) (-) (-) 
EC3           -0.126 -4.24 0.030 0.000 
EC4           -0.123 -3.11 0.039 0.002 
BIG4 0.338 6.36 0.053 0.000  0.308 5.45 0.057 0.000  0.309 5.72 0.054 0.000 
AFIS 0.284 4.51 0.063 0.000  0.286 4.55 0.063 0.000  0.294 4.69 0.063 0.000 
SMALE -0.068 -2.06 0.033 0.040  -0.059 -1.77 0.033 0.077  -0.077 -2.32 0.033 0.020 
ACHANGE -0.002 -0.06 0.036 0.949  -0.006 -0.18 0.036 0.860  -0.008 -0.21 0.036 0.835 
SIZE 0.473 35.24 0.013 0.000  0.473 35.23 0.013 0.000  0.470 35.16 0.013 0.000 
LISTED 0.386 8.75 0.044 0.000  0.380 8.60 0.044 0.000  0.367 8.32 0.044 0.000 
SQRSUB 0.138 19.58 0.007 0.000  0.138 19.67 0.007 0.000  0.139 19.80 0.007 0.000 
LOSS 0.224 7.15 0.031 0.000  0.224 7.16 0.031 0.000  0.229 7.34 0.031 0.000 
REC 0.885 8.53 0.104 0.000  0.868 8.34 0.104 0.000  0.841 8.11 0.104 0.000 
N = 2389  N = 2389   N = 2389 
F-value = 113.91  F-value = 112.57 
 F-value = 112.11 
Adj. R2 = 0.7680   Adj. R2 = 0.7684   Adj. R2 = 0.7701 
Note 1. EC = SAEXPCAT; EC1 = 0-5 years, EC2 = 6-15 years, EC3 = 16-25 years, and EC4 = 26-40 years. 
Note 2. Industry dummies and year dummies included in the models. 
Note 3. Two-tailed t-tests for all variables.
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Table 5 – Regression Results for the Big Four Subsample. 
                              
  Model 1   Model 2   Model  3 
Variable Coefficient t-value Std error p-value  Coefficient t-value Std error p-value  Coefficient t-value Std error p-value 
Intercept 2.094 7.44 0.282 0.000  1.934 6.87 0.281 0.000  2.000 7.30 0.274 0.000 
LNSAEXP -0.092 -2.72 0.034 0.007           
SAEXP      -0.001 -0.07 0.011 0.945      
SAEXPSQ      -0.000 -0.64 0.000 0.524      
EC1           -0.277 -2.62 0.106 0.009 
EC2           0.000 (-) (-) (-) 
EC3           -0.138 -4.56 0.030 0.000 
EC4           -0.143 -3.45 0.042 0.001 
AFIS 0.281 4.46 0.063 0.000  0.283 4.50 0.063 0.000  0.290 4.62 0.063 0.000 
SMALE -0.070 -2.08 0.033 0.037  -0.061 -1.80 0.034 0.073  -0.082 -2.42 0.034 0.016 
ACHANGE 0.006 0.16 0.038 0.873  0.002 0.06 0.038 0.953  0.004 0.10 0.038 0.917 
SIZE 0.488 35.43 0.014 0.000  0.487 35.24 0.014 0.000  0.485 35.25 0.014 0.000 
LISTED 0.398 8.80 0.045 0.000  0.393 8.67 0.045 0.000  0.382 8.43 0.045 0.000 
SQRSUB 0.131 18.24 0.007 0.000  0.132 18.33 0.007 0.000  0.132 18.40 0.007 0.000 
LOSS 0.242 7.56 0.032 0.000  0.242 7.59 0.032 0.000  0.245 7.72 0.032 0.000 
REC 1.008 9.07 0.111 0.000  0.993 8.92 0.111 0.000  0.964 8.67 0.111 0.000 
N = 2201  N = 2201   N = 2201 
F-value = 109.46  F-value = 108.20 
 F-value = 107.48 
Adj. R2 = 0.7702   Adj. R2 = 0.7707   Adj. R2 = 0.7721 
Note 1. EC = SAEXPCAT; EC1 = 0-5 years, EC2 = 6-15 years, EC3 = 16-25 years, and EC4 = 26-40 years. 
Note 2. Industry dummies and year dummies included in the models. 
Note 3. Two-tailed t-tests for all variables.
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5.2.2 Regression Results 
The interpretation of regression results entails assessing the overall fit of the model and the 
individual regression coefficients of the independent variables. Both the variables of interest 
(audit fees, in this case) and the control variables are assessed, as the as well as the control 
variables (Wisniewski 2009, pp. 377-382). The interpretation of the results reported in 
Tables 4 and 5 is begun by first noting any marked deviations from expectations within the 
individual regression coefficients. Such deviations may imply faulty data or a mistaken 
understanding of the relationship of these variables with the dependent variable (Ibid 2009, 
p. 377). Afterwards, the overall fit of the model is assessed, followed by a more detailed 
analysis of the results concerning the experience variables as well as other findings of 
interest. 
In line with predictions, the three models obtained positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for most control variables in both samples at p<0.01 (see Tables 4 and 5 above). 
These variables therefore make statistically significant contributions to the models. 
However, before moving onto the test variables, it must be noted that one control dummy 
variable did not obtain significant coefficients (at p<0.05) in any of the three models in either 
of the two samples. This variable was the dummy variable of whether the audit partner and/ 
or firm was different from the previous year (ACHANGE). The non-significant coefficients 
are somewhat puzzling at first sight. The literature on audit fee low balling (e.g. Fung et al. 
2012; Huang et al. 2015; Kwon et al. 2014) suggests that fees are discounted during the first 
year of an engagement, at least in the case of audit firm rotation. Since audit partner rotations 
are more common in the data set than are firm rotations, it may be the case that these partner 
rotations diluted the potential effect of audit firm rotation and hence no significant result was 
obtained. However, dropping this variable from the models does not substantially alter the 
results. The interpretation therefore proceeds with an assessment of the overall fit of the 
models.  
A statistical examination reveals a relatively close fit with the data for all three regression 
models. All models obtained high adjusted R2 values for both samples ranging from 76.8% 
to 77.0% in the full sample and slightly higher figures of 77.0% to 77.2% in the Big Four 
subsample. The F-tests indicate that all models were significant at p<0.001. The models 
therefore explained nearly 80% of the variation in the audit fees. The results obtained here 
thus compare well with the standard of an adjusted R2 of 70% or higher in audit fee research 
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reported by Hay (2013). Model three, which utilized the experience category dummies 
(SAEXPCAT), had the highest explanatory power in both samples, suggesting that this 
definition of experience best represents the underlying relationship among the three models. 
The results obtained for the test variables show marked differences between the three models 
in the full sample. Model 1 obtained a non-significant negative coefficient of -0.049 for 
LNSAEXP, opposite of what was expected. This result does not indicate a significant positive 
association, and it is therefore inconsistent with H1. Given the literature covered in the 
previous chapters, this result appears illogical, and it cannot therefore be accepted at face 
value. The analysis continues with models 2 and 3, which may provide further insight into 
this finding.  
Model 2 also found non-significant coefficients on its experience variables SAEXP (0.004) 
and SAEXPSQ (-0.0003). The signs of these coefficients indicate a downwards opening 
parabola, meaning that as experience increases, the fees first rise and then begin to fall after 
reaching the highest point. However, the coefficients were non-significant (p=0.651 for 
SAEXP, and p=0.315 for SAEXPSQ), so this result cannot be taken to indicate such a 
relationship. As discussed in chapter 5.2.1., this may be due to the high correlation (Pearson: 
0.98) observed between these two experience variables, rather than due to such a relationship 
not existing. This multicollinearity issue increases the standard errors of the coefficients, 
with the effect of decreased t-values and a corresponding drop in the significance of the 
results. 
Model 3 used categorized experience dummies where auditors were categorized into the 
following groups by levels of experience: (1) 0-5 years, (2) 6-15 years, (3) 16-25 years, and 
(4) 26-40 years.  Group 2 was used as the reference group, and the coefficients for groups 1, 
2, and 4 indicate the effect relative to this reference group. All three dummies obtained 
significant coefficients at p<0.01. Interestingly, all of these coefficients had a negative sign. 
Fees were thus highest for the group with 6-15 years of experience, and lower for both less 
experienced (0-5 years) as well as more experienced auditors (16-40 years). The differences 
in fees between these groups can be calculated in percentages based on the regression 
coefficients of the SAEXPCAT dummy variables (EC1-EC4). The fees for groups 1, 3, and 
4 were -25.3%, -11.8%, and -11.5% lower, respectively, compared with group 2. In other 
words, fees are this much lower for each group relative to the reference group, when 
controlling for other variables. This result is also in line with what was observed in the 
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analysis of correlations in chapter 5.1.3, where this second experience group (EC2) was the 
only one that had a significant positive correlation (Pearson 0.06; Spearman: 0.07) with 
AFEE.  
Further regressions with different reference groups also display the pattern described above, 
with significantly (p<0.01) lower fees for the other groups relative to group 2. No significant 
difference was found between groups 3 and 4, indicating that there is no drastic drop-off in 
fees for auditors approaching retirement. These results are inconsistent with H1, as were the 
results for model 1. The results for model 3 suggest that inexperienced auditors charge lower 
fees, and that fees peak within 15 years of authorization. Thereafter fees fall below these 
peak levels, but do not appear to fall further near retirement, as no significant difference was 
noted between EC3 and EC4. This may indicate that the auditors do not in fact have reduced 
incentives towards the end of their careers. 
The results for model 3 show that the relationship between experience and fees is non-linear 
in the full sample. This also explains the negative coefficients found on LNSAEXP with 
model 1, as the logarithmic form of LNSAEXP clearly does not fit the data in the way it was 
originally expected. The results for model 3 suggest that the quadratic definition experience 
utilized in model 2 might have also fit the data, though this could not be observed, likely due 
to high multicollinearity between SAEXP and SAEXPSQ. 
The results for the Big Four subsample were similar to those obtained from the full sample. 
As in the full sample, model 1 produced a negative coefficient of -0.092 for LNSAEXP, 
significant at p<0.01. This indicates that no positive relationship between experience and 
fees exists in the Big Four audit firms, inconsistent with H1. The coefficients on SAEXP and 
SAEXPSQ in the second model were non-significant (p=0.945 and p=0.524, respectively), 
as they were in the full sample. Moreover, the results for the different categories of audit 
experience utilized in model 3 followed the same pattern as in the full sample, and all groups 
had significant coefficients at p<0.01. Here again the most inexperienced and the most 
experienced auditors showed negative coefficients relative to the reference group of 6-15 
years. The fees for groups 1, 3, and 4 were -23.5%, -12.9%, and -13.4% lower, respectively, 
compared with the reference group. The relationship between experience and fees appears 
therefore to be similar in both samples. Thus, the results of models 1 and 3 applied to the 
Big Four subsample are also inconsistent with H1, while model 2 failed to find the proposed 
parabolic relationship.  
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More in line with expectations, a significant positive coefficient was found on AFIS 
(p<0.001) for both samples with each of the three models. A higher market share of an audit 
firm in a given industry is therefore significantly associated with higher audit fees in the 
samples. Though this measure deals with industry specialization on the audit firm level, it 
has been argued that industry-specialization ultimately lies in individual auditors (see 
chapter 3.1.2). It is possible that a significant part of the marketable skills that an auditor 
acquires through years of work experience relates to industry-specific knowledge rather than 
task-specific or general auditing knowledge. However, an effect on fees of such experience 
at the individual audit signee’s level is unlikely to be transmitted through the firm-level 
variable to such a degree that it would dilute the results for the experience variables. If the 
potential fee effect of experience were, however, mediated by industry specialization at the 
firm-level, these results would suggest that it is not overall experience per se that clients are 
willing to pay higher fees for.  
Interestingly, the coefficients on SMALE are negative and significant for models 1 and 3 in 
both samples (p<0.05). This is in line with the findings of Ittonen and Peni (2012) and 
Harides et al. (2015), who also found significant premiums for female auditors. However, 
research on this issue remains scarce. Moreover, the coefficients on SMALE were non-
significant in both samples with model 2 in this study. 
5.2.3 Discussion 
The results obtained here concerning audit experience support those of Hardies et al. (2015), 
though they contrast with the results of Cahan and Sun (2015) from the Chinese audit market 
and Niemi’s (2004) evidence from the Finnish audit market. The differences compared with 
Cahan and Sun (2015), however, may be due in part to the very different cultural and 
regulatory context of China, which could play into the determination of fees. Niemi (2004) 
also found a positive association in the Finnish audit market, though here the focus was on 
smaller firms and his sample included mostly HT auditors (the lower tier of authorization). 
Most of these auditors were self-employed. He used survey data on the more direct measure 
of hourly billing rates of auditors, as opposed to total fees from a given engagement. These 
differences in design may well have contributed decisively to the different results obtained 
therein.  
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The results of these regressions against a positive association between experience and fees 
were robust to the different functional specifications of the experience variables in models 1 
and 3. Model 1 did not find a significant positive coefficient on LNSAEXP in either sample. 
Model 3, in turn, suggested a different type of relationship where fees initially rise, followed 
by a decrease after the early to middle years of an auditor’s career. This was the case in both 
samples. Model 2 failed to establish a parabolic relationship between experience and fees, 
likely due to high multicollinearity, and its results therefore neither support nor refute those 
of models 1 and 3. Given the weight of evidence obtained against the hypothesis H1, the 
research question is thus repeated for reassessment: 
RQ1: Is the overall audit experience of authorized public accountants associated 
with higher audit fees in the audit market of large Finnish companies? 
The results suggest that an individual auditor’s audit experience is indeed associated with 
fees in the audits of large Finnish companies. However, the evidence does not point to a 
relationship where audit fees grow constantly with experience. Rather, the results suggest a 
non-linear relationship, where fees tend to start out low in the early years after authorization, 
followed by a rise to peak levels roughly in the middle or early to middle years of the 
auditors’ careers. The fees then fall below peak levels, but do not drop further in the very 
late years of an auditor’s career. H1 is therefore rejected.  
However, some speculations may be made about the reasons behind these patterns. The 
rationale behind the hypothesis was that auditors tend to accumulate valuable experience as 
a result of working on many different clients over several years. This could then facilitate 
the acquisition of other types of knowledge (see Figure 3 in chapter 3.2). This was then 
expected to lead to higher audit quality in the form of actual monitor strength, as they auditor 
utilizes their expertise to perform better on specific audit tasks. Higher audit quality in turn 
was expected to lead to higher audit fees via promoting long-term stability in the financial 
markets as accounting scandals become less frequent and as the auditor’s reputation is 
enhanced (see Figure 2 in chapter 2.4.1). The results obtained here aren’t in fact wholly 
inconsistent with these propositions. Rather, it seems that the intuition regarding the 
relationship between experience and fees only holds up to a certain point. 
It may be the case that auditors accumulate experience that translates into higher quality and 
audit fees in the early years of their careers, but that they quickly begin to face severe 
diminishing returns, and at some point perhaps stop learning altogether. As discussed in 
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chapter 3.1.1 it was concluded that behavioral research, overall, suggests more positive 
connections between experience and fees than negative connections. It was also noted that 
the effects are likely to be indirect, that is, facilitated by more specific levels of knowledge. 
Behavioral research suggests that experience may lead to, for instance, weaker professional 
skepticism among experienced auditors (Shaub & Lawrence 2002, cited in Nelson 2009), 
better decision making when faced with high-complexity tasks (Abdolmohammadi & 
Wright 1987), and more integrated, though also more altered, mental representations of 
information (Moeckel 1990).  
Based on the results obtained in this study, it appears that whatever the pathways mediating 
this relationship may be, they do not as a whole contribute significantly to higher audit fees 
in the latter half of an auditor’s career. This is the case when other factors are controlled, 
though the portfolios of more experienced auditors do generally appear to contain larger and 
more complex clients. This is partly consistent with Bonner and Lewis (1990) and Ashton 
(1991) who emphasized the role of more specific types of knowledge over expertise. Yet, as 
Libby and Tan (1994) suggested, these results also support to some degree the notion that 
experience facilitates the acquisition of knowledge, as indicated by the higher fees in the 
group with 6-15 years of experience compared to those with up to 5 years of experience. It 
should be noted that the results also cannot be taken to indicate that these patterns in fees 
reflect the monitoring strength of auditors, as reputational and other factors may play into 
the pricing of the engagements. The design of this study did not allow for the 
disentanglement of these other factors from monitoring strength. Further research could 
improve upon the design of this study by also investigating the associations between 
experience and measures of monitoring strength as well as market perceptions of quality.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigated whether a positive relationship exists between audit experience and 
audit fees in the audit market of large Finnish companies. In doing so, it sought to extend 
the scarce literature on the effects of individual auditors’ personal characteristics on audit 
quality and fees. 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of what the objectives of an audit are, what stages comprise 
an audit as a process, and what constitutes audit quality. It was concluded that audit 
experience may influence the audit process in many ways which could lead to differential 
quality between different audit engagements, even within the same audit firm and with the 
resultant audit opinion held constant. It was also noted that audit quality can be viewed based 
on the markets’ assessments of an auditor’s competence and independence, in line with 
DeAngelo’s (1981a) view. Moreover, a distinction can also be made between these market 
assessments and the actual monitoring strength of the auditor, as noted by Watkins et al. 
(2004). Experience was proposed to potentially affect both monitoring strength as well as 
perceptions of quality. 
Chapter 3 provided an provided an overview of behavioral research and other literature 
linked to audit experience and examined the specific ways in which experience may come 
to contribute to audit quality and thereby fees. The literature review of behavioral research 
indicated that, overall, audit experience might be more likely to contribute positively toward 
quality and fees, though not all of these studies pointed in this direction.  
Additionally, the literature covered in Chapter 3 suggests that experience has an indirect link 
with fees, and that consequently more detailed measures of specific types of knowledge may 
be preferred in most research. Yet, it was also proposed that experience does facilitate the 
acquisition of these types of knowledge, in line with the arguments of Marchant (1990) and 
Libby and Tan (1994). Thus, overall experience could be used as a proxy for these types of 
knowledge. Research on auditor tenure and client or industry specialization on both the firm-
level as well as the level of an individual audit signee was also summarized. It was concluded 
that both strains of research seem to indicate a positive relationship between these factors 
and audit quality as well as fees, though here too the evidence is not unequivocal. Finally, 
the construction of audit fee models was summarized, and it was noted that the most common 
variables in audit fee models relate to the client’s size, complexity, and risk, as well as some 
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characteristics of the auditor. These served as the basis of the empirical investigation 
conducted in chapters 4 and 5. 
The results obtained in this study suggest that overall audit fees do not have a relationship 
of monotonic growth with audit experience, leading to the rejection of the hypothesis of this 
study. This result was robust to different definitions of the test variables in both samples, 
with neither model 1 nor model 3 finding support for monotonic growth in fees with 
increasing experience. Model 2 failed to establish a parabolic relationship, likely due to 
multicollinearity issues. The results contrast with two other studies (Cahan & Sun 2015; 
Niemi 2004) that have examined this relationship, though they are consistent with the 
findings of Hardies et al. (2015). However, these differences compared with Cahan and Sun 
(2015) and Niemi (2004) may very well stem from differences in study design and their 
contexts, as the former study was conducted in the Chinese audit market and the latter 
concerned chiefly Finnish HT auditors, who tend to audit smaller clients. The sample sizes 
used in this study (2389 for the full sample; 2201 for the Big Four subsample) can be 
considered quite large compared to the standards in the audit fee literature, thus contributing 
to the reliability of these results.  
The relationship between experience and fees that was observed here appears as follows: 
fees to start out low, rise to their peak by the middle point of an auditor’s career and then 
drop to a lower level for the latter half of it, but without a drastic drop-off right before 
retirement. This may suggest that the compensation schemes of the audit firms in Finland 
are effective in preventing auditors from feeling compelled to slow down dramatically at the 
end of their careers. The evidence obtained here suggests that experience plays some part in 
the acquisition of marketable knowledge, in line with Marchant (1990) as well as Libby and 
Tan (1994). Yet, the results are also consistent with Bonner and Lewis (1990), who argued 
that the effects of experience on fees relate mostly to more specific levels of knowledge.  
The results also imply that, when dealing with measures of audit experience in relation to 
fees, simple linear definitions are unlikely to suffice. Additionally, overall experience may 
have to be broken down further to specific types of knowledge to gain more detailed insight 
into the different pathways through which it may influence fees. Sufficiently large sample 
sizes are warranted to tease out the fine distinctions between these connections at different 
stages of an auditor’s career. Overall, the results suggest that the personal characteristics of 
auditors are relevant in audit fee studies and should be included in fee models where possible. 
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The control variables used in the models mostly obtained signs consistent with prior research 
for both samples. However, the auditor change dummy (ACHANGE) did not obtain a 
significant coefficient in either sample, likely due to definitional issues. This did not 
substantially affect the results for the rest of the models. Interestingly, a female price 
premium was also noted as a significant negative coefficient on SMALE with models 1 and 
3, in line with the findings of Ittonen and Peni (2012) and Hardies et al. (2015). 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the evidence cannot substantiate claims 
made about a causation between audit experience and higher auditor monitoring strength. 
Though fees are often used as a proxy measure for quality (DeFond & Zhang 2014; Francis 
2004), experience could be associated with fees through reputation. The design of this study 
did not allow for the disentanglement of these. Second, the study design also did not permit 
separating in detail the various types of knowledge an auditor may acquire through 
experience. Such distinctions could provide valuable insight into how experience affects fees 
on a more specific level. Third, despite the reasonable sample sizes utilized in this study, the 
samples may not have been quite large enough to fully capture the finer distinctions between 
the effects of experience among different groups. Larger samples could have allowed a more 
granular breakdown of the experience categories. Fourth, this study concerned the Finnish 
audit market of large companies, and the results cannot therefore be directly extrapolated to 
other contexts. This is particularly so given that the evidence reported by Cahan and Sun 
(2015) and Niemi (2004) contrast with this study. 
This study revealed several potential paths for future research. First, as noted by Cahan and 
Sun (2015) and Gul et al. (2013), the personal characteristics of auditors have received 
relatively little attention in auditing research. Yet, these results suggest that the individual 
characteristics of auditors are relevant for such studies, and it is therefore proposed that more 
research is conducted in this area. For instance, studies with different definitions of 
experience can shed further light into its relationship with audit quality and fees. The female 
audit fee premium noted here is also worthy of further research. Studies into audit quality, 
as distinguished between the reputational part and monitoring strength, could establish a 
better understanding of whether auditors are able to translate their work experience into 
higher quality and fees. Additionally, new behavioral studies could be conducted to bring 
that strain of research up to date with the changes in the auditing profession and to equip 
researchers with detailed insights into the impacts of experience on audit work. 
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